Parts to Wholes: the Socionomic Systems Nexus

In two previous entries I listed the major questions that do not seem to be a part of the debate over Iraq policy and then dove down into the first one: what happens if we leave. In this entry I’d like to look at what happens if we stay – that is, how can we achieve our strategic goals ? Which the last post identified as a viable, secure and prosperous Iraq that provides a better environment for it’s own citizens and stability and access to oil in the Middle East.

None of these are easy questions though you can find them discussed here and there. But any debate about the subject should – and to the best of my knowledge no pundit, talking head, columnist, politician nor official has said much, if anything, in a broad public forum. So with those limitations in mind I’d like to offer a series of considerations that might get us started, and are subject to extension and revision as more is brought forth.

The basic goals include Security and Stability of the country, establishment of effective governance and administration, including dealing as best as possible but realistically with the endemic corruption problem and spoils-based sectarianism, getting the economy going again starting with necessary reconstruction, the re-establishment of public services and development of public infrastructure such as schools, college, highways and hospitals.

While we build this shopping list there are three other things to keep in mind. One is that the Iraqis have been a hard-working, educated and secular society who are likely to do well for themselves and others if given decent government. That should also recognize the immense oil wealth they should be able to draw on to fund economic development. Next this is neither solely the responsibility of the US nor likely to work without our active support. Disingenuous policies that lay full responsibilities on the Iraqi system before it’s capable of bearing the load are self-deceiving. Finally, in the ‘we broke it, we should fix it’ school of moral responsibility we would seem to have some obligations to put in a best-faith effort here.

Iraq seems to be split into three regions with the North mostly Kurdish and having both oil reserves along with over a decade’s development to show it can be done. The South/Southeast is largely Shia who have been the poor and oppressed under Baathist and Sunni rule; and who also have the closest ties and have been receiving extensive sub-rosa but quasi-official support from their fellow Shia in Iran. And the West is largely Sunni, desert, un-developed and tribal, sparsely settled and with little in the way of oil reserves. And then there’s Baghdad  which is likewise split between Shia and Sunni.

1.      Security and Stability will need to be provided in each region as well as Baghdad. It’s likely best based on local forces backed up by US ones. Which requires time and effort to develop though considerable progress has been made. In the interim the US has re-discovered and re-developed Counter-Insurgency doctrine and operations (COIN) which we’ve actually got over two centuries of successful experience with.

• Baghdad is a special case complicated by the prevention of successful interventions on the part of US forces by internal Iraqi politics; i.e. the prevention of actions against Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army by the sitting prime minister. However the slowly growing surge has been accompanied by intelligence reports that al-Sadr has fled to sanctuary in Iran, which is progress.

2.      Effective governance starts with, as the generals have put it, ‘standing up the major Iraqi ministries. Heretofore they’ve been regarded as prizes in a political spoils game and allocated based on political influence; and further, run for the private benefit of the faction and tribes who gain control of the ministry. The resulting corruption is endemic to Iraqi, one is tempted to say Arab, society but must at least be mitigated.

• Setting, establishing and maintaining minimal standards of effectiveness and honesty will be a major challenge and one not natural to the society. Both culturally and as the result of the hangovers from Saddam’s Stalinist regime. This is an area where we can and should put pressure on the central government as well as doing our best to educate the administrators and ministers in the long-term benefits of reasonably honest government. Unfortunately they have had little prior exposure to an effective civil service – something we take for granted.
• Both Generals Abizaid and Petreus have observed that military force is 20% of the solution and 80% lies in civil development. Very…very unfortunately the military has been asked to step up to these responsibilities and has done its’ level best without having the proper background. The integration of DoD, State Dept., AID and other agencies goes by the label “Unified Action” and internecine bureaucratic conflicts in the US government (turf-wars and self-interest) have interfered significantly. This is the area least developed and served to date yet a critical part of any successful nation-building exercise.

3.      Reconstruction and economic development are the critical next phases that build on the foundations of security and minimally effective governance. In actual fact great strides have been made but face two major obstacles. One is a peaceful enough environment which progress on points #1 and #2 will help with. The second, and again one not touched on much, is that Saddam’s regime diverted its’ available resources into palaces, bribes and weapons and allowed the economic infrastructure of the country to decay. Development and public services, as well as providing jobs and growth, are both dependent on stability and security.

4.      Long-term development of schools, healthcare and other public resources would naturally build on some success in #3. We should be around so long to see it come about.

In looking at these preliminary strategic requirements there are things that can be seen as immediate requirements and things that will take much more time. But progress on the earlier requirements will be encouraging for the later. At the same time we have to have realistic expectations of what can be accomplished when. While that’s unclear, to me and I suspect others, making progress on the first two in the next 18 months will be great progress. If at the end of 4-5 years the economy has achieved significant progress then it’s possible that a self-sustaining virtuous cycle will be established. And conversely if we aren’t prepared to commit to the point where economic growth in a stable civil environment is beginning to take hold our strategic goals will remain in jeopardy.

It seems clear to me that the massive turnouts for the two general elections, at the risk of voter’s lives and those of their families, are very strong indicators of their interests in peace and prosperity, as well as in democracy. Nonetheless we must face the policy question of is democracy the best alternative in the immediate future. Adam Smith was right when he said, "Little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice." If we can put in place a civil infrastructure that provides those things Iraq will begin to move ahead at its’ own pace. As progress continues the opening for a greater role for democratic institutions, from the local to province to national levels, will improve.

We can summarize this first pass on a multi-component ‘model’ of strategic policy as follows:

 The ‘grades’ are artificial (I made them up based on my best impressions) and will change as more is learned. But, give or take the key requirements and the key areas, expecting a C or a D to suddenly leap to an A is completely unrealistic. If in 18 months we manage to reach a C+ on security in Baghdad and a C on governance and re-construction, and the weighted national grades follow suite then we will have made amazing but real progress.

The questions are do we have the patience and commitment to make realistic policies and commitments, can we bring the Iraqis along with us – or more accurately coach them to bring themselves along and will we decide to make the investments. And if you believe any of the previous post on the consequences that investment has to be weighted not against a cost-free withdrawal but against the consequences of a major regional conflict.

Resources and Sources:

Harvard’s Kennedy School has distinguished public guests address topics of major importance:

·          Petraeus: Reflections & Observations: http://ksgaccman.harvard.edu/iop/events_forum_video.asp?ID=2994  

·          Abizaid on the Long War: http://ksgaccman.harvard.edu/iop/events_forum_video.asp?ID=3048 (Magnificent, deeply insightful, direct - even blunt)

·          Negroponte on global security challenges: http://ksgaccman.harvard.edu/iop/events_forum_listview.asp?Type=PS

 

Unified Action: Col. Austin Bey is one of the few commentators addressing this issue and has written about it on both his blog and StrategyPage.com . The latter is highly recommended as a well-grounded resources for security and stability information. Col. Bey’s most recent column: http://www.strategypage.com/onpoint/articles/200721444410.asp

Previous Posts:

Iraq: the Big Questions

Big Question #1: What Happens If We Leave 

 

Posted by dblwyo at 02:40 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

In an earlier entry we put up the five big questions that ought to be and aren’t being asked regarding the situation in Iraq. Let me defer questions #2-5 for follow-on and list the serial consequences that would appear to be risks and possibly escalating ones that ensure from a badly handled and/or too rapid US withdrawal.

And preface this short, “pungent” little list by saying that the reason for it is that, to me, all the sound bite political discussions seem to be pretty explicitly assuming that we can walk away and there won’t be any serious consequences. I couldn’t disagree more and think, if anything, this is an even more dangerous situation than when we entered.

But let’s be honest here as well. Likely we all wish the situation had never come up but that’s a historical debate which we can have another day and place and time. Today we’re faced with situation as it is – not as we wish it to be. And continuing with the honesty, and guessing that everyone shares my view on this, I sure wish it were possible to walk away with no consequences. Or that there were a simple, workable, practical answer to our dilemmas. Or even better one that was fast and cheap. Let’s admit that to ourselves and more on.

 

The fact is that there is no sound-bite simple answer to this one.

All our options are ugly and difficult. And carry enormous risks.

So be it – let’s deal with it and move on.

Here’s my breakdown of Question #1 – what happens if we leave laid out as a series of steps and consequences. One after the other as a first step cascades into a next. This isn’t just my thinking – in fact it captures the best I’ve been able to gather up from generals and analysts looking for answers based on facts. Not political advantage.

1.1 Domestic partisanship inside Iraq escalates into widespread sectarian violence and a stable state is prevented from developing.

1.1.1 Iraq splits into loosely coupled federalism but the risk of devolving to a failed state is high to very high.

1.2  A "failed" Iraq (at whatever level) ends up as a terrorist haven in the Sunni and Shia sections with rising export of aggressive violence.

1.3 Escalating tensions and threats draw in the associated regional powers: Saudia Arabia and Jordan on the Sunni side and Iran on the Shia

1.3.1 Background: it is Iranian money, weapons and support that is enabling the Sadr militias and has been growing exponentially over the last three years as deliberate strategic policy that's accelerating under the current regime Iranian regime.

1.3.1.a It’s likely that Iran sees instability in Iraq as a strategic opportunity. If for no other reason than to bog down the US and divert world attention from it’s other initiatives. Including nuclear weapons and support for terrorists in Lebanon and Palestine.

1.3.2 Iranian covert intelligence  and operations teams have been found laying the groundwork for insurrection in all the minor Gulf States.

1.3.3 Iranian support for Hamas and Hizbollah appears to have been a major factor, if not the primary  trigger, in the recent war in Lebanon. While Hizbollah failed in an objective sense they disrupted Lebanon and distracted the UN from Iranian sanctions. Hizz. is pursing a follow-on strategy of disrupting Lebanese stability and political cooperation, refusing to be disarmed and attempting to gain major representation in the government preparatory  to over-throwing the legitimate government.

1.4 Regional tensions involve Jordan/Saudia vs Iran in a wider, perhaps covert but likely to be overtly violent regional conflict of growing intensity.

1.5 A regional conflict reduces worldwide access to the regions oil supplies significantly. Upto and including cutting off access to the only marginal swing production capacity and proven reserves in the world oil market thereby causing a major worldwide economic dislocation.

1.5.1 Given that the world oil market is one single pool with shared demand & supply China and India as well as Russia may be able to retain access thereby partially mitigating worldwide excess demand if the West can draw on other sources.

1.5.2 At the least oil shows a major price surge, magnitude unknown but one can envision it as being of the same order as the surge during the 70s from $10 oil to $30 oil. In other words we need to ask could oil surge to over $100/barrel ?

1.6 Resource and focus diversions created by the regional conflict increase the pressures on Pakistan and Saudia Arabia to where they suffer major internal outbreaks of violence.

1.6.1 A protracted and relatively severe civil collapse in Pakistan creates the risk of another major failed state, increases safe heavens for terrorists and, at some point, increases the risks of terrorist and rouge state access to WMD, particularly nuclear weapons. For example after NKor's fizzle it's not clear that the Iranians have the technical wherewithal to create a nuclear weapons program. It's also not clear that they don't. Pak. has been successful and access to it's technologies would be increase by orders of magnitude.

1.7 Long-term demographic pressures from a exponentially growing population, under 25, with limited education, no decent job prospects and increasingly failing state societies raises the likelihood of a demographically driven implosion throughout the ME. This would include Egypt, Palestine, Syria, et.al.

1.8 As long as the US and other major world economies are dependent on oil for the bulk of their transportation energy and for much of the rest of their energy supplies their economies are highly vulnerable. Preserving access, unless we all want to literally freeze in the dark, is a VITAL national interest of the US, the West and the rising powers. That would include China and India. Only Russia might be relatively immune from direct impacts.

1.8.1. Serious alternative energy infrastructures, e.g. nuclear power for electricity, etc., would take a concerted national effort AND three decades.

1.8.2 Under these circumstances the major international powers are likely to do whatever they find necessary, upto and including sending major military forces into the ME to seize control of the oil fields.

1.8.2.1 - BTW one of the reasons that the Saudi's proved so reasonable about increasing supplies in '79 was that the then Def. Secretary  Schleisinger threatened to send in the 18th Airborne Corp immediately. At least according to well-found rumor in the military and intelligence communities.

That would seem to carry the likely and probably next steps of a failure and precipitate withdrawal out far enough to make the strategic cost/benefits much clearer. It would seem fair to me, to the extent you find the listing accurate and the assessments credible, that we ought to come to two major conclusions:

1. The risks of withdrawal may actually exceed those of staying – particularly and especially if that withdrawal is precipitate, hasty and ill-executed.

2. A stable Iraq, of some form, coupled to a stable Middle East is an increasingly important vital national interest of the United States.

• To which I’ll add that a prosperous Iraq and ME, more concerned with developing itself into a set of modern states and focused on nurturing the well-being of it’s citizens and societies, is (at least) a significant national interest as well.

All of that being the case so then what do we do ? We’ll take up that question in our next entry but may I suggest that you really….really owe it to yourselves to ask your next favorite politician, public representative or presidential candidate what they think the answers are to the original question. And insist on testing each and every simple-sounding throw-away sound-bite against these. I’m not asking in other words for you to agree with the question or my assessments. Rather I’m suggesting it’s in your own best interests to insist on public answers that satisfy you.

PRIOR POSTS:

Thinking About Iraq: a Balanced Perspective ? 

Iraq: the BIG Questions

Posted by dblwyo at 03:06 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Earlier we tried to ‘set the table’, so-to-speak by carefully outlining the approach to assessing the strategic situation in Iraq. As important as this is to the well-being of America and the world, and out of respect for ourselves, our troops, the Iraqis and the dead and injured, we owe it all of us to be judicious.

The biggest problem I see by all parties is the pursuit of simple minded solutions without examining the trade-offs, implications or consequences that taking many of those solutions as sound policy requires. That is stopping at the first step in a chain of analysis, preferably with an intent that supports your pre-judgments and prejudices and ignores all the issues and trade-off considerations of those choices as you imply. We need to take several more turns of the crank, starting with the few  big, critical questions that are not being addressed. And then taking each of them in turn through several steps of asking, "so what then  ?"

Here's my list of big strategic questions I don't see on the table:

1. If we leave what are the consequences of exiting ? Admitting beforehand that the style, timing and circumstances are important.
2. If we stay what needs to be accomplished to achieve our strategic goals ?
3. Who are the relevant parties in Iraq, what are their interests and what are the likely to do ?
4. What kind of international and regional support/interference is likely and how do we best influence it ?
5. What kind of US domestic politics are likely and what can we do to create the necessary support to make our strategic choices workable ?

There may be more but that seems a long enough and careful enough list to not only get started but to move far ahead of where we are or where we've ever been. Tom Sowell makes that comment that most policy debates are over intent and don't just neglect but completely ignore the actual incentives and constraints of selected policies and the several steps beyond the first necessary to map out the likely consequences. It's certainly characteristic of this situation.

In fact in looking around there doesn’t seem to be a single, simple or straight-forward source one can go to even see these questions being asked let alone being addressed.

The shortness of the list is not a measure of it’s importance.

PRIOR POSTS:

Thinking About Iraq: a Balanced Perspective ? 

Posted by dblwyo at 02:29 PM | Permalink | Comments (1)

These days I mostly work in Firefox with occaisional forays into Explorer. From some early feedback the entries appear to have some lines of web code spacing paragraphs in IE. Not sure what the reason for that is nor quite - yet - how to fix it. But sorry about that - please keep reading and we'll do our best.

This blog will be something of an on-going technical exercise as well as a content development lab and broadcast. Hopefully features and functions will add to the usability as I get better. But please bear with .

 And the same caveat and plea of course applies to the content.

Posted by dblwyo at 08:01 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Or is it a partisan debate based on already established, pre-conceived and hardened positions ? One based on domestic political concerns rather than a careful investigation into our own long-term bests interests and those of Iraq, the Iraqis and the region ?

With all the back and forth on Iraq it's hard to get the mental distance to think about it clearly and with all the factors weighted, weighed and balanced. And we seem to be more focused on what sounds good in Peoria, or the Upper West Side for that matter, than on where our own best interests might lie. Very hard to sort out. But almost all of the discussions seem to me to ignore the long-term consequences and the risks, irrespective of where you stand on the original decisions.

When we look at major policy issues like this our approach is often an important, indeed critical part of the examination. And especially worth doing if you happen to believe, as I do, that this is one of the most important foreign policy issues that will impact our place in the world for decades. Put that another way - the risks are enormous, the consequences of not considering them could be severe and it’s in our own personal interests to invest a little time in thinking about those issues.

By and large in huge-scale issues of this sort the original and continuing decisions are made based on our (actually politicians and policy-makers) intent for the outcome rather than asking what processes are going to be put in motion. There’s one critical question that should be repeated multiple times:

WHAT HAPPENS THEN ?

That is, what is the next step in our examination, and the next and the next. Thinking beyond stage one – time-consuming, difficult and expensive. But all too often un-intended consequences are not so much unintended as a failure to ask that question.

One can argue that the initial decision likely was taken without such consideration, aside from ‘normal’ military planning and post-conflict civil affairs planning. One can further argue that as the conflict has evolved, major shifts in our opponents strategies and tactics haven’t received the broad examination they deserve. Though we should recognize the superb efforts, spirit and adaptive ingenuities of our military forces. While questioning the broader policy and operational contexts they've struggled to make good on.

But here’s the other major, salient fact: we are where we are and much as I’d like to go back and re-think all these earlier steps the consequences we face will be as the result of the decisions we take now and going forward.

By and large we do not seem to be examining this in terms of consequences if we walk. And careful evaluation of alternatives and the means, mechanisms, incentives and constraints facing ALL the players also seems to be missing.

It also seems fair to say that US sectarian partisanship, that puts domestic political advantage ahead of strategic requirements, will likely sacrifice sound policy for something that sounds good in the headlines. Instead of what might actually work on the ground, in the region and for us in the long-run. Our ability to open up those sorts of questions depends though on not being willing victims of political gamesmanship but instead insisting that our collective leadership take responsibility for seriously addressing the real, under-lying character of the challenge, the alternatives and the mechanisms.

Politicians, and thereby policy makers, tend to focus on short-term, sound-good INTENTIONAL choices because that’s what we best respond to. Let’s try another approach based on looking at the parts, the incentives and constraints and try to extrapolate reaonsable guestimates as to how things might play out. In other words how the system will roll forward given our choices.

Instead of what feels and sounds good might we consider some interesting, scary questions ?  What will follow in a multi-part set of entries is my best attempt to lay out some of those questions and the best answers that can be put together from a wide range of inputs and my own bit of analysis.

I hope you find it worthwhile.

Posted by dblwyo at 11:05 AM | Permalink | Comments (1)