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May 09, 2007

Big Question #3: What Needs to Happen in Iraq ?

This is the third in a series of five Big Questions about the Iraq situation and its’ viability – that is what are our chances for pulling it off without a catastrophe that will haunt us. Actually in an earlier post listing the questions it was phrased a bit differently:  Who are the relevant parties in Iraq, what are their interests and what are they likely to do ?  The prior post started to answer the first two parts so we can dig deeper into the last one. Re-phrasing it as, “what needs to happen and who’s doing what to whom ?”.

It’s taken a while to get to this post because of the Sturm und Drang surrounding the discussions plus the accumulation of existing and new materials to accumulate and review from After-Action reports by Barry McCaffrey to Gen. David Petreus’ and Pres. Bush’s appearances on Charlie Rose (with the re-vamping of his web site the archives of past shows are easily available and these are highly recommended as is the briefer appearance of ABC’s Chief Correspondent).

But my earlier assessment and framework appears to be holding up very well as a tool for examining what’s going on and as a way to think about the issues and challenges. Earlier I’d suggested that a simple but coherent framework for summarizing all the disparities and complexities was useful and, perhaps, somewhat unique. By and large my last few weeks of reviews support that view. As well as the associated one that more attention is being paid to the security issues, especially in Baghdad – as perhaps it should in the very short-term, to the damage of keeping aware of and some focus on bigger issues. While clearly attention and effort is going into civil affairs, re-construction and economic re-development and political development it seems, at least to me, that these are still under-resourced and piecemeal and ARE NOT receiving the attention necessary. Of course one always faces resources shortcomings and has to make trade-off decisions between priorities as well as considering timeframes. In other words if we focus on security now that may establish the stability necessary to shift attention and resources to the other areas.

 

South (Shia)

North (Kurd)

West (Sunni)

Baghdad

National

Security & Stability

C+/B-

B/B+

C/C+(C-/D+)

C-/C(D/D-)

C/C+

Governance

C

B+/A

D

D

C/C+

Reconstruction

C

B

D

D

C/C-

Long-term Development

TBD

TBD

TBD

TBD

TBD

If we re-visit the evaluation framework from the prior post it still appears fair and accurate both as a template for evaluation and on most of the specifics. There are a few early signs of significant improvement however, though it’s likely to early to make a strong assessment. Two keys are the so-far earlier successes of the “Surge” in Baghdad (which raises the grade from D/D- to C-/C) and very effective successes in Anbar province, the desert stronghold west of Baghdad which has been a tribal areas that’s served as a major areas of strength and operational support for alQueda and the Baathist irredentists. Which raises that grade to a C/C+.

However, it’s too early to tell if those increases in security will result in increases in civil peace and economic development. There the jury is still very much out. Nationally there have been some puts and takes on governance – Moqtada al-Sadr has withdrawn his adherents from the National Gov’t which may actually be to the good since it removes more extremist and parochial faction members farther from the levers of power. Supporting that the President of Iraq, Talabani, has allowed security forces to act against Shia militias during the surge. Which is long-overdue and very difficult given the hatreds that were exponentially grown by the insurgent destruction of the Samarra mosque as well as long-simmering hatreds. Conversely staff close to Talabani has been active in removing police and military commanders who are Sunni from their commands, despite their being judged by Americans as among the best and most honest.

In addition more Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been deployed. These are teams of military forces, military civil affairs troops and civilian experts, including folks from the State Dept., who provide a core of expertise to help coach the Iraqis. Re-development strategy has also been shifted from big-bang projects which went nowhere to more local projects that are more feasible, affordable and involve more immediate local employment, and thereby, favorable impacts. Also progress has been made on establishing a National Law on oil management and revenue sharing – which is a major sticking point between the various factions.

All of these internecine faction politics, that put faction ahead of national interest, are a key sticking point and perhaps the most dangerous.

May 04, 2007

Lieberman Responds: Sorta

After commenting on Sen. Lierberman's editorial I e-mailed his office and got a form letter reply. While a stand response it struck me as one of the more balanced and comprehensive approaches to strategy on Iraq and I'm re-publishing it here.

 

Thank you for contacting me regarding U.S. military operations in Iraq. I continue to receive many letters offering suggestions as to how the United States should proceed, and I certainly appreciate hearing your thoughts.

In 2003, I supported the use of force in Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power because I believed that he was a grave threat to our country, his people, and the world; and I continue to believe that decision was right. Since then, I have often disagreed with how the war has been run. And I have not hesitated to speak out about the mistakes the Bush Administration has made, mistakes that have made this war more costly than it should have been. But I have worked hard to stay away from partisan political attacks because that is unacceptable when our nation is at war. And I continue to believe that how we end our involvement in Iraq will have a significant effect on our security for a long time to come.

The Administration was wrong for not: (1) securing the support of enough of our allies in the run-up to the war; (2) having enough troops on the ground; (3) having a sensible plan to win the peace and establish stability in Iraq after Saddam fell; and (4) sooner putting the Iraqis in charge of their government and their economy, including their oil supply.

Despite these serious handicaps, we have made some hard-won progress. We have helped the Iraqis to write a constitution, hold three historic democratic elections, form a government, and build an Iraqi army. But the past year since the February 2006 terrorist bombing of the Shiite Mosque in Samara by Al-Qaeda has been painfully disappointing.

The one question that really matters right now is how to move forward and provide a better future for the Iraqi people and more security for the American people. And, in my view, that question is not just about when we get our troops home, but also how we get our troops home and what they leave behind. I believe it is every bit as much of a mistake to stay in Iraq indefinitely, both for the Iraqis and for us; and I have consistently opposed an open-ended commitment of American troops.

I believe the U.S. mission in Iraq is critical to America's national security, and we must do everything possible to try to succeed. America's commitment of military and non-military personnel and other resources must be in response to conditions on the ground as determined by our military commanders, rather than by adherence to arbitrary deadlines.

In December of 2006, I spent ten days traveling in the Middle East and speaking to leaders there, all of which has made one thing clearer to me than ever: while we are naturally focused on Iraq, a larger war is underway. On one side are extremists and terrorists led and sponsored by Iran and Al-Qaeda. On the other are moderates and democrats supported by the United States. Iraq is the central battlefield on which that conflict is being fought today. How we end the struggle there will affect not only the region but our worldwide war against the extremists who attacked us on September 11, 2001.

Because of the bravery of many Iraqi and coalition military personnel and the recent coming together of moderate political forces in Baghdad, I believe the war is still winnable. The American people are justifiably frustrated by the lack of progress, and the price paid by our heroic troops and their families has been heavy. But what is needed now, especially in Washington and Baghdad, is not despair but decisive action -- and soon. I have confidence in the ability of the U.S. military to get the job done.

To get this right, we have to put aside our partisan differences; talk to each other with respect; and have an honest, direct discussion about how to go forward now and end this conflict in America's interests. I want to get past the false and empty choice between continuing to do just what we are doing and just giving up and pulling out, both of which are recipes for more failure and less security.

I believe the President's proposal to surge more troops there now is a new approach that can succeed. After speaking with our military commanders and soldiers, I strongly believe that additional U.S. troops must be deployed to Baghdad and Anbar province -- an increase that will at last allow the coalition troops and the Iraqi army to establish security throughout the Iraqi capital, hold critical central neighborhoods in the city, clamp down on the insurgency, and defeat Al-Qaeda in that province. We should put a priority on building logistics capabilities in Iraqi units and increasing the strength of the Iraqi security forces. We must ensure that they are supplied with the essentials to sustain the fight against the insurgency, including better equipment and weaponry. Then we must focus more resources on the creation of jobs and the provision of basic services in the greater Baghdad area. Also, I am glad that the President has moved to form a bipartisan working group on the war on terrorism in this new session of Congress, as he mentioned in his State of the Union address.

We must also get tougher with the Iraqi political leadership. They must do a better job of cracking down on the militias; beefing up the reconstruction efforts; and building a genuine, well-functioning unity government. Success in Iraq can best be built from the center out. Once we prevail in Baghdad, the task of making progress throughout the country will be much more achievable. Success will require more than action in Iraq; it will require supportive action here in Congress.

As a member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, and Chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, I am closely following the situation in Iraq. I appreciate your taking the time to write me with your thoughts. Please be assured that I will keep your views in mind as we move forward.

My official Senate web site is designed to be an on-line office that provides access to constituent services, Connecticut-specific information, and an abundance of information about what I am working on in the Senate on behalf of Connecticut and the nation. I am also pleased to let you know that I have launched an email news update service through my web site. You can sign up for that service by visiting <a href="http://lieberman.senate.gov/">http://lieberman.senate.gov</a> and clicking on the "Subscribe Email News Updates" button at the bottom of the home page. I hope these are informative and useful.

Thank you again for letting me know your views and concerns. Please contact me if you have any additional questions or comments about our work in Congress.

May 02, 2007

Sen. Lieberman on Consequences

Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-CT) has an interesting editorial in today's Wall St. Journal, or the free OpinionJournal on how bitter partisan divides in Congress are putting our own sectarian conflicts ahead of good policy. Instead he suggests - as I read it - at least two things. First with more troops, a new commander, an evolved strategy and - something he doesn't mention but is implicit - more support from the Iraqi government plus Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani on suppressing Shia sectarian violence and establishing a sustainable security presence in Baghdad - there is an improved chance for recovering a window of opportunity.

His second major point is that the bureaucratic and legislative death of a thousand obstructions not only doesn't serve us well in terms of presenting ourselves abroad. It's based on the explicit argument that our sudden and precipitate withdrawl, even if just from Baghdad, has no real consequences.

That's about as false-to-fact, and knowably so, as any policy argument we've seen in a long time. There is NO responsible party on record in agreement with it. Yet the legislative foot-dragging is precisely that sort of political stratgy which puts domestic, partisan and political advantage ahead of the national interests of the country.

When Wellington went to the Pennisula he had Parliamentary officers playing politics behind his back. Caeser went to Gaul and fought it out there for political reasons and I've no doubt so did Sargon in his time. Certainly in our own history political generals and partisan politics were built into the very fabric of the Civil War. Politics may be inescapable but it's not clear they serve us well.

It'd be worth your time to read Lieberman's editorial comments, kick the tires a little and think it through for your ownself. At least don't just drink the kookaid, excuse me my fingers slipped, koolaid because it's there. Ask what's in it first.

The Choice on Iraq 

And in case you'd care to read my earlier examination of the scenarios for our withdrawl and the consequences therein you can find it in previous posts: 

What Happens If We Leave ?  plus one on sketching the conditions for strategic success: What Needs to Be Done If We Stay ?

My goal here is not to start with persuading you to a conclusion. Rather it's to persuade you to a process of consideration and let the conclusion follow from the careful consideration of the availble information. In other words let us do our own thinking rather than getting wafted along with the headlines. If after giving it just some little bit of thought you reach conclusions vastly different from mine that's not good, but it is fine. The stakes here though are higher than is being acknowledged by anyone in public forums and always have been.