Big Question #3: What Needs to Happen in Iraq ?
This is the third in a series of five Big Questions about the Iraq situation and its’ viability – that is what are our chances for pulling it off without a catastrophe that will haunt us. Actually in an earlier post listing the questions it was phrased a bit differently: Who are the relevant parties in Iraq, what are their interests and what are they likely to do ? The prior post started to answer the first two parts so we can dig deeper into the last one. Re-phrasing it as, “what needs to happen and who’s doing what to whom ?”.
It’s taken a while to get to this post because of the Sturm und Drang surrounding the discussions plus the accumulation of existing and new materials to accumulate and review from After-Action reports by Barry McCaffrey to Gen. David Petreus’ and Pres. Bush’s appearances on Charlie Rose (with the re-vamping of his web site the archives of past shows are easily available and these are highly recommended as is the briefer appearance of ABC’s Chief Correspondent).
But my earlier assessment and framework appears to be holding up very well as a tool for examining what’s going on and as a way to think about the issues and challenges. Earlier I’d suggested that a simple but coherent framework for summarizing all the disparities and complexities was useful and, perhaps, somewhat unique. By and large my last few weeks of reviews support that view. As well as the associated one that more attention is being paid to the security issues, especially in Baghdad – as perhaps it should in the very short-term, to the damage of keeping aware of and some focus on bigger issues. While clearly attention and effort is going into civil affairs, re-construction and economic re-development and political development it seems, at least to me, that these are still under-resourced and piecemeal and ARE NOT receiving the attention necessary. Of course one always faces resources shortcomings and has to make trade-off decisions between priorities as well as considering timeframes. In other words if we focus on security now that may establish the stability necessary to shift attention and resources to the other areas.
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| South (Shia) | North (Kurd) | West (Sunni) | Baghdad | National |
Security & Stability | C+/B- | B/B+ | C/C+(C-/D+) | C-/C(D/D-) | C/C+ |
| Governance | C | B+/A | D | D | C/C+ |
| Reconstruction | C | B | D | D | C/C- |
| Long-term Development | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
If we re-visit the evaluation framework from the prior post it still appears fair and accurate both as a template for evaluation and on most of the specifics. There are a few early signs of significant improvement however, though it’s likely to early to make a strong assessment. Two keys are the so-far earlier successes of the “Surge” in Baghdad (which raises the grade from D/D- to C-/C) and very effective successes in Anbar province, the desert stronghold west of Baghdad which has been a tribal areas that’s served as a major areas of strength and operational support for alQueda and the Baathist irredentists. Which raises that grade to a C/C+.
However, it’s too early to tell if those increases in security will result in increases in civil peace and economic development. There the jury is still very much out. Nationally there have been some puts and takes on governance – Moqtada al-Sadr has withdrawn his adherents from the National Gov’t which may actually be to the good since it removes more extremist and parochial faction members farther from the levers of power. Supporting that the President of Iraq, Talabani, has allowed security forces to act against Shia militias during the surge. Which is long-overdue and very difficult given the hatreds that were exponentially grown by the insurgent destruction of the Samarra mosque as well as long-simmering hatreds. Conversely staff close to Talabani has been active in removing police and military commanders who are Sunni from their commands, despite their being judged by Americans as among the best and most honest.
In addition more Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been deployed. These are teams of military forces, military civil affairs troops and civilian experts, including folks from the State Dept., who provide a core of expertise to help coach the Iraqis. Re-development strategy has also been shifted from big-bang projects which went nowhere to more local projects that are more feasible, affordable and involve more immediate local employment, and thereby, favorable impacts. Also progress has been made on establishing a National Law on oil management and revenue sharing – which is a major sticking point between the various factions.
All of these internecine faction politics, that put faction ahead of national interest, are a key sticking point and perhaps the most dangerous.