Now that we're getting back into the swing of things it seemed like it was time to re-visit Iraq. As part of that we reviewed all the prior '07 collections of stories and links and consolidated them below. It actually turns out to be much longer than anticipated and might have been better split into two major postings. However the number of major stories has dropped so precipitously that that may not be required in the future. We'll see but in the meantime here's a single central place to go. While you may not care to "read" them we'd suggest it's worth a quick skim of the excerpts, at least the titles. What you'll find, we believe, is a rather rapid and deep structural change in what's going on.
If you'll cast you mind back to about this time last year the biggest headlines were about the plans for a "Surge" to support a major new counter-insurgency doctine. Which was bitterly opposed by all right thinking sorts, mainly the Democrats but certainly with the obvious exception of McCain almost silent Republican support. In fact many of them were bailing out. Yet talk about a withdrawl, even a precipitous one, was still a major headline thruout the summer. As you'll be able to see below. It slowly began to be displaced by another meme of "Gen. Petraeus needs time". Actually given an initial surge and doctine change circa Feb/Mar to "neutral" results by mid-summer to a very strong status report in Oct. or so, which was still badly poo-poohed by most of the pundits, including the faculty at the Kennedy School (some of whom had helped shape it !) to now when, lo and behold, it's come off the table. More interestingly it's also come out of the candidates back of major themes to hammer on. Which in a way is really too bad since we should have a serious national debate.
Meanwhile we'll point you at the extensive listing of stories and links below the continuation, the two excerpts below and rather recent Charlie Rose appearance by the Bagdhad bureau chief of the NYT which has a certain tone of "gee, we didn't expect this to work and we can't tell you why it is but it is though there are still problems". Which is about what Petraeus and everybody has been saying for some time.
Introduction
Here's the introductory excepts which put it all in a nutshell:
1. This Won't Be The Iraq Election The Presidential campaign has jostled this way and that, contenders have risen and fallen, but the one fixture in the political firmament has been Iraq. Polls have consistently said Iraq would be the central issue of the 2008 campaign. The candidates have developed elaborately studied and rehearsed positions on the war. But what if the subject moves off center stage? In the new NEWSWEEK Poll, the economy now tops Iraq as the issue that voters say will most influence their choice for president, 22 percent to 19 percent. When the president announced the surge last January, I wrote a column arguing that it was likely to succeed militarily (by providing better security) but would probably fail politically (because of a lack of political reconciliation). I was both right and wrong. More U.S. troops have meant better security. But they are not at the heart of current improvements in Iraq. The key is that Petraeus has been willing to do what no American official has until now: accept Iraq for what it is and not what Washington wants it to be. Searching for a stable order, Petraeus has allied himself with whoever, within reason, could produce that order.
2.
Petraeus's Iraq I've just returned from a week in Iraq with Gen. David Petraeus and his operational commanders. My intent was to look at events from an operational perspective and assess the surge. What I got was a soldier's sense of what's happening on the ground and, although the jury is still out on the surge, I came to the conclusion that we may now be reaching the "culminating point" in this war. The culminating point marks the shift in advantage from one side to the other, when the outcome becomes irreversible: The potential loser can inflict casualties, but has lost all chance of victory. The only issue is how much longer the war will last, and what the butcher's bill will be. Battles usually define the culminating point. In World War II, Midway was a turning point against the Japanese, El Alamein was a turning point against the Nazis and after Stalingrad, Germany no longer was able to stop the Russians from advancing on their eastern front. Wars usually culminate before either antagonist is aware of the event. Abraham Lincoln didn't realize Gettysburg had turned the tide of the American Civil War. In Vietnam, the Tet offensive proved that culminating points aren't always military victories. Culminating points are psychological, not physical, happenings. But successful counterinsurgency operations don't capture fixed objectives. They create what soldiers call "white spaces," areas devoid of influence, political vacuums that compel occupancy by either an enemy seeking to rebound after defeat or by legitimate government forces seeking to establish regional control. In Iraq now, the white spaces are being filled with a newly resurgent Iraqi military and clusters of Concerned Local Citizens Councils, which sprouted spontaneously as Sunni tribal sheikhs smelled both success and commitment from us. To be sure, Baghdad and the surrounding belts are not yet safe. But culminating points are psychological events. What I witnessed firsthand in Iraq was a shift in opinions and a transfer of will among Iraqis, not a classic military takedown. This change was palpable and unmistakable. Whether this military culminating point can translate into a political and economic culminating point remains to be seen. But the campaign that took place from spring until late summer reinforces the classic tenet of warfare, that success on the ground sets the conditions for diplomatic and political success. Retired Major Gen. Scales, a former commandant of the Army War College, is president of Colgen Inc., a defense consulting firm.
15Jul07
The Lie Mutually Agreed Upon Yet another Marine has won a court victory in the investigation of the battle at Haditha – adding more doubts to the claims of a massacre. In this case, the officer conducting an Article 32 hearing (equivalent to a grand jury hearing in civilian courts) has ruled that charges should be dropped. In essence, the claims of a massacre at Haditha are now looking false. That said, al Qaeda, through some adept media manipulation, has still won a victory.
Why I Declined To Serve What I found in discussions with current and former members of this administration is that there is no agreed-upon strategic view of the Iraq problem or the region. In my view, there are essentially three strategies in play simultaneously. The first I call "the Woody Hayes basic ground attack," which is basically gaining one yard -- or one city block -- at a time. Given unconstrained time and resources, one could control the outcome in Iraq and provide the necessary security to move on to the next stage of development. The second strategy starts with security but adds benchmarks for both the U.S. and Iraqi participants and applies time constraints that should guide them toward a desired outcome. The value of this strategy is that everyone knows the quantifiable and measurable objectives that fit within an overall strategic framework. The third strategy takes a larger view of the region and the desired end state. Simply put, where does Iraq fit in a larger regional context? The United States has and will continue to have strategic interests in the greater Middle East well after the Iraq crisis is resolved and, as a matter of national interest, will maintain forces in the region in some form. Of the three strategies in play, the third is the most important but, unfortunately, is the least developed and articulated by this administration.
22Jul07
Commanders and U.S. Envoy Seek More Time for Iraq :The top commanders in Iraq and the American ambassador to Baghdad used video links with Washington on Thursday to appeal for more time, both to allow for success on the ground, and to more fully assess if the new strategy is making gains. But their appeals, in a trio of video sessions to Capitol Hill and the Pentagon, were met with stern rebukes from lawmakers from both parties. Senior Republicans and Democrats told the generals and the ambassador that time is running out, both for Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki to reach accommodation with warring religious factions inside the country and for what remains of Congressional support for the heightened troop levels that President Bush ordered in January.
Bush, Iraq Critics Both Duck Debate on Impact of Their Policies: President George W. Bush and his critics, locked in an argument over what happens next in Iraq, have side-stepped the vital issue of what happens later. As a result, the Senate debate on Iraq this week focused entirely on near-term questions such as whether security is improving on Baghdad streets or if Iraqi politicians will act by September to unify their country. What is absent, according to national security experts, is any discussion of the long-range implications of these clashing visions for Iraq: the probability that a pullout would precipitate a huge spike in violence while a sustained commitment would keep troops on the ground for years to come.
29Jul07
Exit Strategies If U.S. combat forces withdraw from Iraq in the near future, three developments would be likely to unfold. Majority Shiites would drive Sunnis out of ethnically mixed areas west to Anbar province. Southern Iraq would erupt in civil war between Shiite groups. And the Kurdish north would solidify its borders and invite a U.S. troop presence there. In short, Iraq would effectively become three separate nations. That was the conclusion reached in recent "war games" exercises conducted for the U.S. military by retired Marine Col. Gary Anderson. "I honestly don't think it will be apocalyptic," said Anderson, who has served in Iraq and now works for a major defense contractor. But "it will be ugly."
Iraqi Withdrawal: Seven Scenarios : What happens if the United States and coalition forces withdraw rapidly from Iraq? The U.S. and the Iraqi governments have their own scenarios. Iran, al-Qaida, Syria and Turkey have also analyzed potential outcomes. Business and government make plans. Every plan anticipates a future outcome. Since the future can't be predicted, the best plans acknowledge uncertainty. Acknowledging uncertainty means accepting risk -- the risk of being wrong. The art of leadership is being "less wrong." Here are seven "scenarios" sketching "potential outcomes" of a quick withdrawal from Iraq. These scenarios are not mutually exclusive. You will find bits and pieces in all seven:
· Why Iraq Can Weather a U.S. Troop Withdrawal: The U.S. could withdraw the bulk of its forces from Iraq without facing the dire consequences predicted by some of the war’s defenders, says former U.S. diplomat Peter Galbraith. In the war’s first few years, backers of the U.S. invasion talked about the advantages of victory. Now, says Mr. Galbraith, the U.S. presence in Iraq is largely defended with the warning that if the U.S. leaves, violence in Iraq would intensify, destabilizing the region and exacerbating the terrorist threat to the U.S.
· What If...' Given the problems and US casualties in Iraq, polls show a large majority of the American people believe the invasion of Iraq was a mistake. Yet, if we imagine what the world would look like today if Saddam Hussein had not been deposed, it seems clear that almost no outcome in Iraq would be as adverse to the interests of the United States as today's world with Saddam still in power. It is important to recall that Saddam had thrown the UN weapons inspectors out of Iraq in 1998, and only allowed them to return in 2002 because of the credible threat of a US attack. In addition, the sanctions regime was collapsing—Saddam had learned how to extract billions of dollars for weapons out of the humanitarian exceptions to those sanctions--and our European friends, and perhaps UN officials themselves, were complicit in this. Under these circumstances, Saddam could not have been "contained" or rendered harmless, and Iraq could not have been indefinitely subject to UN inspections. At some point, Saddam would have been able to throw out the inspectors again, with no further action by the UN. It was clear that the UN itself would do nothing to enforce its own resolutions.
The Real War and Why It's Ignored: There are several large scale counter-terror operations going on. Each one has five to ten thousand troops (usually about a third of them Iraqi) sweeping through an area long used by terrorists for bases.) One such operation, "Marne Torch" reports that, after six weeks, 1,152 buildings were searched, 83 terrorists killed, 278 arrested or captured (depends on if they were armed and shooting when caught), 51 weapons caches found, 51 terrorist boats (used to move men and weapons via water) destroyed and 872 suspects entered into the electronic database. That last item, the database, is proving more valuable as time goes by. With nearly half a million people entered in it so far, more of the usual suspects are being identified and eventually arrested. But the war is still not the major problem. Corruption and incompetent government are. Corruption is pervasive throughout the Middle East, and so common that it is simply accepted by most locals and foreign visitors. But the inability to create a civil society leads to widespread incompetence in government. Then there's the Sunni Arab intransigence. Most of the violence initially came from Sunni Arabs, led by military officers and secret police officials who wanted their jobs, and privileges, back. The Sunni Arabs have a high opinion of themselves, which is somewhat justified by their high educational and skill levels. For most of the last year, the U.S. response to the corruption, incompetence and intransigence has been to attack it head on. This is how things are done in the Middle East. Except for Israel and Turkey, there are no working democracies in the region. It's all bullies and police state politics. The locals understand a good hit up side the head.
5Aug07
General Petraeus Needs Time 'This [Iraq] war is lost," Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid has stated emphatically and without qualification. "There's simply no evidence that the escalation is working," he said recently. It requires "blind hope, blind trust" to believe in progress of any sort. Sen. Reid is now in the position of having to deny facts on the ground in order to sustain his bleak judgments. And his job is getting more difficult all the time. Shiite death-squad activity and executions in Baghdad have significantly decreased since January. In Anbar Province and increasingly in Diyala Province, tribal sheikhs have turned against al Qaeda and are now siding with American and Iraqi Security Forces (these are examples of "bottom-up" political reconciliation for which we had been hoping). Attack levels in Anbar have reached a two-year low. Ramadi, once among the most dangerous cities in Iraq, is now dramatically safer. Violence in Fallujah has declined. Al Qaeda's networks and safe havens are being disrupted beyond anything we have seen before. Perhaps this attitude is rooted in war weariness. The Iraq war has been a long and difficult struggle. Mistakes and misjudgments have been made, false summits have dashed early hopes, and more than 3,600 American military lives have been lost, causing unspeakable grief for families and friends of the fallen. Yet tragically, more often than not, this is the nature of war, which involves unexpected costs and awful sacrifices. There comes a point in many wars, maybe in most wars, where the single most important issue is whether a nation can summon the resolve and courage to see a good cause through to the end. We are now at that point in the Iraq war. We have in place the right team, pursuing the right strategy. The thing Gen. Petraeus needs above all else, he says, is time. The American political class can give him that time, if it chooses. We are not passive actors in this clash of force and wills, and defeat is not fated. We can still shape the outcome of the war, and with it, the future of the Middle East.
· Pentagon May Find Bombs, Heat, Vietnam Lessons Extend Iraq Exit The Pentagon, under pressure to start planning for an Iraq withdrawal whether it begins in two months or two years, may find that getting out will take a lot longer than getting in. U.S. troops will have to contend with terrorist bombs, wilting heat, dangerous roads and logistical logjams that even critics of the war say will make a rapid pullout impossible. ``I thought it would take six months,'' said Representative John Murtha, a Pennsylvania Democrat who first advocated withdrawal in 2005. ``I found out since then it will take longer than that, the footprint is so much bigger.'' Calls are building in Congress and among Democratic presidential candidates for a drawdown of U.S. forces and for the Pentagon to begin planning how to do it. Two senior Republican senators, John Warner of Virginia and Richard Lugar of Indiana, want to see such a plan by Oct. 16, and Democrats such as Senator Hillary Clinton of New York also have raised the issue. While the administration has opposed the Warner-Lugar legislation, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, in a July 25 letter to Clinton, said the Pentagon is doing ``contingency planning'' for how the U.S. would withdraw from Iraq ``at the right time.'' The pressure to change course in Iraq is likely to peak in September, when Congress gets a report from two top U.S. officials in Iraq that all sides in the debate have identified as a pivotal moment.
· Joint Chiefs Nominee Questioned on Iraq The Navy admiral nominated to become chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said Tuesday that American military efforts in Iraq would fail unless Iraqi leaders did more to bridge sectarian divides. But he also warned that a rapid exit of American troops could turn Iraq into a “cauldron” for broader Middle East strife. The failure of the Iraqis to make progress toward political unity imperils Iraq, said the nominee, Adm. Michael G. Mullen, who said that unless things changed, “no amount of troops in no amount of time will make much of a difference.” He said he believed that the American troop increase this year in Iraq had helped tamp down violence, saying security was “not great, but better.” But he also said that the United States risked breaking the Army if the Pentagon decided to maintain escalated troop levels in Iraq beyond next spring.
A War We Just Might Win VIEWED from Iraq, where we just spent eight days meeting with American and Iraqi military and civilian personnel, the political debate in Washington is surreal. The Bush administration has over four years lost essentially all credibility. Yet now the administration’s critics, in part as a result, seem unaware of the significant changes taking place. Here is the most important thing Americans need to understand: We are finally getting somewhere in Iraq, at least in military terms. As two analysts who have harshly criticized the Bush administration’s miserable handling of Iraq, we were surprised by the gains we saw and the potential to produce not necessarily “victory” but a sustainable stability that both we and the Iraqis could live with. But for now, things look much better than before. American advisers told us that many of the corrupt and sectarian Iraqi commanders who once infested the force have been removed. The American high command assesses that more than three-quarters of the Iraqi Army battalion commanders in Baghdad are now reliable partners (at least for as long as American forces remain in Iraq). Another surprise was how well the coalition’s new Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams are working. Wherever we found a fully staffed team, we also found local Iraqi leaders and businessmen cooperating with it to revive the local economy and build new political structures. Although much more needs to be done to create jobs, a new emphasis on microloans and small-scale projects was having some success where the previous aid programs often built white elephants.
- Recalibration It's a cardinal rule in Washington, for reporters and politicians: never let yourself fall behind a scandal, story or trend. That's why we're starting to see a "recalibration" on Iraq by members of the mainstream media, and even some Democrats in Congress. As El Rushbo detailed yesterday, a shift appears to be underway inside the Beltway, with reporters and pols saying things about Iraq that were unimaginable just a few weeks ago. Look for more to join their ranks in the coming weeks, ahead of the September report by our top ground commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus.
19Aug07
On the Road to Jalalabad Sen. Hillary Clinton has cynically charged that we are "losing the fight to al Qaeda and bin Laden" in Afghanistan. But on my eighth trip to Afghanistan (last month) I saw that the trend lines are up, not down. The first encouraging sign came in Dubai as I boarded my flight for Kabul. Afghanistan's main private air carrier, Kam Air, has recently added a second daily round trip between Kabul and Dubai.I spotted similarly hopeful trends in three heavily Pashtun provinces -- Nangarhar, Laghman and Khost -- in eastern Afghanistan. But first, it's important to note that to talk about "reconstruction" is the biggest lie in Afghanistan. Before the Soviet invasion in 1979, Afghanistan was long one of the poorest countries in the world and has never had a lot of infrastructure. There are ruins in the country, of course, but 95% of them are in or near Kabul itself. Most of Afghanistan lives much as it always has, subsisting on small-scale farming and trading. We can do nothing about many of Afghanistan's barriers to development. For starters, 86% of its land area is non-arable. It has also never had a broad distribution of income or land. According to Afghan-Australian historian Amin Saikal, up until the early 1920s when King Amanullah gave crown lands to the poor, only 20% of peasants worked their own properties. This is why many foreign development experts working in Kabul say privately that if in a couple of decades Afghanistan reaches the level of Bangladesh -- which in 2006 had a per capita GDP of about $419 per year, one of the lowest in the world -- then they will judge their time in the country a success.
- Syrian Survey Despite powerful anti-American feelings and support for Iraqi fighters, 63% of Syrians still favor Syria working with the United States to help resolve the Iraq war. This is the most stunning finding of a new and unprecedented nationwide survey of Syria by Terror Free Tomorrow. It was conducted from a country in the region by phone during July, and more than a thousand people were interviewed across all 13 provinces of Syria.
- The United Nation Returns to Iraq Four years after an explosives-packed suicide cement truck blew up and destroyed the U.N. headquarters building in Baghdad, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to expand its operation in Iraq. The Aug. 19, 2003, terror bombing wounded over a hundred people and murdered 22. The dead included the distinguished Brazilian diplomat Sergio Vieira de Mello, who was serving as the United Nations' "special representative" in post-Saddam Iraq. Then-U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan had prevailed on de Mello to take the job. De Mello viewed himself as a diplomat with a lot of experience in "the field" -- which he once described in an essay as a place where he had "seen the best and worst of what we have to offer each other." Everyone who has worked in the world's various hells understands that confronting them requires charity, mercy, discipline, courage and sacrifice. That was de Mello's point and why he went to Iraq. In the wake of the 2003 massacre, the United Nations effectively withdrew from Iraq, maintaining an office in Jordan and a flickering presence in Baghdad. Arguably, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 (passed on June 8, 2004) ratified the general thrust of U.S. political development policy in Iraq. It mapped a route to full Iraqi sovereignty and stated that the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) would play a leading role in elections, "consensus building," national reconciliation, and judicial and legal reform.
- Fantasies and Competence Coexist Shia warlord Moqtada al Sadr appears to have fled back to Iran once more, apparently in reaction to increased military pressure on his armed followers. The U.S. knows who al Sadr's key military lieutenants are, and these guys are being arrested, or killed while trying to avoid capture. When American and Iraqi forces raid Sadr's people, they often find Iranians (who claim to be religious pilgrims). There are 2,760 foreigners in Iraqi jails, including 800 Iranians. Most of the rest are Arabs. Iraq would like some cooperation from the countries these people, most of them terrorism suspects, came from. The Iranians deny any involvement, despite incriminating documents and the confessions of some of their agents. Iraqis are getting tired of Iranian involvement, especially after Iran sponsors the assassination of popular Iraqi Shia politicians, as recently happened with the anti-Iranian governor of Qadisiya province. Sunni Arab politicians are openly pleading with neighboring Sunni nations to rescue Iraqi Sunnis from Iranian-backed attacks. These pleas have been made before, and are largely ignored now. No one wants to back a loser, especially a loser that kills Moslem women and children.
Professors on the Battlefield The Human Terrain System. It embeds social scientists with brigades in Afghanistan and Iraq, where they serve as cultural advisers to brigade commanders.The Human Terrain System is part of a larger trend: Nearly six years into the war on terror, there is reason to believe that the Vietnam-era legacy of mistrust -- even hostility -- between academe and the military may be eroding. This shift in the zeitgeist is embodied by Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander of the multinational forces in Iraq. Gen. Petraeus, who holds a doctorate from Princeton University in international relations, made a point of speaking on college campuses between his tours in Iraq because he believes it is critical that America "bridge the gap between those in uniform and those who, since the advent of the all-volunteer force, have had little contact with the military."
9Sep07
A Fatwa Against Violence Last week, I participated in a three day meeting here that included six of the most senior Iraqi Sunni and Shia religious leaders. At the meeting, held at a Marriott hotel in a Cairo suburb, they formally agreed to "end terrorist violence, and to disband militia activity in order to build a civilized country and work within the framework of law." This gathering was a truly historic event, given the authority of the participants -- including Sheikh Ahmed al Kubaisi, acknowledged by all Iraqis as the senior Sunni religious authority (the weekly audience for his Friday sermons, broadcast from Dubai, number 20 million), and Ayatollah Sayyid Ammar Abu Ragheef, chief of staff for Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, the acknowledged leader of the Shia community in Iraq and beyond. One has only to consider the power of these specific religious leaders, and the instruments at their disposal for getting results, to grasp the gathering's enormous potential importance. Going well beyond traditional rhetoric in their closing statement late last week, they stated their intention to work for the early issuance of a joint Sunni-Shia fatwa to the Iraqi people. A fatwa such as this will carry the force of law for all followers. Think about that. After more than four years of brutal warfare and untold suffering, the leading religious authorities in Iraq have joined hands and said "Enough," and have committed to use their authority to bring peace to their country.
What France can do in Iraq What can be said about Iraq today? It is a "democratic" country - with a Constitution adopted by referendum and universal direct suffrage - that is at war with itself. It is a country liberated from a bloodthirsty dictatorship - which killed between 2 million and 4 million people - where blood continues to be shed. It is a country of paradox and segmentation, like the hearts and minds of its people. Outside of a highly protected "Green Zone" in Baghdad, and a more or less stable Kurdish region, Iraq is being ripped apart by a storm of hatred and violence that has driven 4 million refugees from their homes and continues to kill nearly 2,000 people every day. I have just returned from three days in Iraq. I went to listen to the candid views of its people - Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds and Christians - in order to get a feel for what they think. I also wanted to express France's complete support for the crucial goal of national reconciliation and for the inclusive dialogue that is needed to bring this about. In my conversations there, I perceived a deep need among many Iraqis for recognition and for new ties with France and Europe. The Iraqis have been isolated for too long and feel abandoned by the international community. After years of debating the American presence in Iraq, the time has come for us to turn our attention to the Iraqis themselves. What can France do to help this ravaged country recover hope? First, it can be modest. No one imagines that we have a magic formula. But as one Iraqi official said when I asked him what France could do, "It can offer a fresh look." Another official added, "Restore our self-respect." The dream of an Iraq at peace with itself is not beyond reach. Much effort, clear-headedness and conviction can make it a reality - provided we all have the courage to get the job done. If we shy away from this, we can expect the worst.
Iraq Domestic
If Maliki Isn’t the Right Man, Who Is Better? Some U.S. politicians have called for the ouster of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, but his departure could undermine the war-torn country’s few surviving pockets of democracy, says historian Juan Cole in Salon. Mr. Maliki has been taking a drubbing lately from both sides of the aisle, as prominent senators look for a politically safe way of attacking the Bush administration’s Iraq policy without seeming soft on defense. Hillary Clinton (D., N.Y.), Carl Levin (D., Mich.) and John Warner (R., Va.) have accused the Shiite Mr. Maliki of not building a stronger coalition with Sunni parties. Mr. Maliki has many faults, says Dr. Cole, but few if any politicians in Iraq could build enough support across the sectarian divide to more effectively achieve U.S. aims. If Mr. Maliki stepped down, his successor most likely would emerge either from his own party or another Shiite party, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council led by cleric Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. The elevation of the SIIC, which is bothfriendlier to Iran than Mr. Maliki and more hostile to Sunnis, hardly would play into U.S. hands. Forming a new government could take six months, deepening the country’s political gridlock. Meanwhile, the split between Sunni factions and the Shiite-Kurdish political alliance might widen, further denting U.S. goals for a peaceful and democratic Iraq. For Republicans in particular, taking on Mr. Maliki avoids raising questions about President Bush’s handling of the war, says Dr. Cole, a professor of Modern Middle East and South Asian history at the University of Michigan. Dr. Cole says U.S. politicians might be right that Mr. Maliki isn’t the right man for the job, but they would do better to leave Mr. Maliki’s fate to the Iraqi parliament, or else “undermine what little faith remains in democracy in Iraq.”
Maliki met with Iraq's top Shiite cleric to discuss the possibility of forming a new government, efforts to fill vacant cabinet posts. During the closed-door meeting in Najaf, Mr. Maliki briefed Mr. Sistani over efforts to fill cabinet jobs vacated when ministers from the largest Sunni Arab bloc and radical cleric Muqtada al Sadr's movement pulled out to protest the prime minister's policies. In addition to filling the cabinet posts, Mr. Maliki said he also discussed the possibility putting together a new government -- one made up of nonpartisan technocrats -- though he emphasized it was currently only an "idea" that was being considered among others. Mr. Maliki didn't give a time frame for making a decision, but he made it clear his government cannot go on indefinitely with an incomplete team of ministers, as has been the case since six Sadrist ministers quit in April over his failure to announce a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign troops in Iraq. The Sunni Arab ministers withdrew in August.
Iraq & US
If Iraq Falls In contrast to President Bush's dark comparison between Iraq and the bloody aftermath of the Vietnam War last week, there is another, comforting version of the Vietnam analogy that's gained currency among policy makers and pundits. It goes something like this: After that last helicopter took off from the U.S. embassy in Saigon 32 years ago, the nasty strategic consequences then predicted did not in fact materialize. The "dominoes" did not fall, the Russians and Chinese did not take over, and America remained No. 1 in Southeast Asia and in the world. But alas, cut-and-run from Iraq will not have the same serendipitous aftermath, because Iraq is not at all like Vietnam. Unlike Iraq, Vietnam was a peripheral arena of the Cold War. Strategic resources like oil were not at stake, and neither were bases (OK, Moscow obtained access to Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay for a while). In the global hierarchy of power, Vietnam was a pawn, not a pillar, and the decisive battle lines at the time were drawn in Europe, not in Southeast Asia. The Middle East, by contrast, was always the "elephant path of history," as Israel's fabled defense minister, Moshe Dayan, put it. Legions of conquerors have marched up and down the Levant, and from Alexander's Macedonia all the way to India. Other prominent visitors were Julius Caesar, Napoleon and the German Wehrmacht. The Bush presidency will soon be on the way out, but America is not. This truth has recently begun to sink in among the major Democratic contenders. Listen to Hillary Clinton, who would leave "residual forces" to fight terrorism. Or to Barack Obama, who would stay in Iraq with an as-yet-unspecified force. Even the most leftish of them all, John Edwards, would keep troops around to stop genocide in Iraq or to prevent violence from spilling over into the neighborhood. And no wonder, for it might be one of them who will have to deal with the bitter aftermath if the U.S. slinks out of Iraq. These realists have it right. Withdrawal cannot serve America's interests on the day after tomorrow. Friends and foes will ask: If this superpower doesn't care about the world's central and most dangerous stage -- what will it care about?
This Isn't Civil War We are winning this war. I write those words from my desk in the Red Zone in downtown Baghdad as hundreds of Iraqis working with my company -- Shia and Sunni, Arab and Kurd -- execute security, construction and logistics missions throughout the capital and Sunni Triangle. We have been here now over three years.American-Iraqi Solutions Group, which I helped co-found in March 2004, has been intimately involved with creating the new Iraqi security services. Our principal business as a U.S. Department of Defense contractor is to build bases for the Iraqi army and police and then supply them with water, food, fuel and maintenance services. We are on the cutting edge of the exit strategy for the U.S. military: Stand up an effective Iraqi security structure and then we can bring our troops home. We are not out of the Iraqi desert yet. But the primary problems we now face on the ground are controllable, given a strong American military presence through 2008. These problems include the involvement of Iran in fueling Shia militancy, the British failure to uphold their security obligations in the south and the tumultuous nature of a new democracy. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker recently said the one word he would choose to describe the feelings of the Iraqi people was "fear." A bad choice, from my observation. That's not the prevailing state of mind, except maybe for those sheltered souls in the Green Zone who are getting hit on a regular basis for the first time in more than a year by primarily Iranian-supplied rockets and mortars. What I see on the faces of the thousands of Iraqis working with us, including our subcontractors and suppliers as well as on the faces of the Iraqi army and police, patrolling and manning the checkpoints and assisting U.S. soldiers in searching for the insurgents is grim determination to get the job done. I also see exhaustion -- exhaustion with the insurgency, whether it be al Qaeda, neo-Saddamist, or Jaish al Mahdi (JAM), or the Shia militia of Moqtada al-Sadr. The exhaustion is real, and the evidence of the falling support among the Iraqi people for the insurgency in its various guises is inescapable -- unless you are deliberately looking the other way. A large proportion of our thousand-man work force -- of which 90% are Iraqi citizens -- comes from Sadr City, the Shia slum in east Baghdad. Many carry weapons. These Shia warriors have emphasized in the past several months that they and their neighbors are tired of conflict and only want to feed their families.
Gen. Petraeus' Pivotal Report There really is no particularly informative historical precedent for Gen. David Petraeus' upcoming public assessment of Iraq. Perhaps we are entering new historical terrain, where the commanding general's pivotal strategic gambit is a media event. And media event it is. With its certain long-term global import and short-term political impact, Petraeus' report meets a hustling television exec's primal requirement: drama. When the spotlight strikes his face and he begins to speak, we will witness drama in large letters. No one, however, should confuse the general's appearance with entertainment. The quick commentators will dub his report a historical pivot. That will be true, but only in a narrow sense. Despite the sensationalist headlines and hyperbolic fretting, given the decades of terror and the centuries of political fossilization afflicting the Middle East, the trend lines in The War on Terror are astonishingly good. Trends are the great truths behind pivotal moments, and Petraeus is aware of that. Since 9-11, America has made great strides in addressing at the fundamental level the social pathologies that seed Islamo-fascist terrorism. In short form it is this: The choice between tyrant and terrorist is no choice. Modernity requires a degree of social consensus and economic liberalization. Iraq is thus a radical experiment in modernity in a vital region afflicted by economic failure, tribal factiousness and oil-dollar powered feudalism.
The Facts On The Ground The major problem in Iraq is back in the United States. There, many politicians either don't bother, or don't want to believe, what is actually happening, and has happened, in Iraq. In a way, that makes sense. Because what is going on in Iraq is so totally alien to the experience of American politicians. But many Americans take a purely partisan, party line, attitude towards Iraq. So logic and fact has nothing to do with their assessments of the situation. The facts are these. Iraq is an ancient civilization that has been subjected to foreign occupation (Mongol, Iranian, Turkish, British) for the last thousand years. Iraq was put together by the British, in the 1920s, from fragments of recently dissolved Turkish Ottoman empire. The northern part of Iraq, containing mainly Kurds, was considered part of Turkey itself, and not an imperial province like the rest of Iraq. But there was oil up there, and the British did not want the Turks to have that, in case there was an effort to revive the Ottoman empire. The British set up a constitutional monarchy, complete with parliament, and royal family imported from Saudi Arabia (a noble family that had been ousted by the Sauds). While democracy was alien to this part of the world, many Iraqis took to it. But there were serious problems with corruption, tribal, ethnic and religious loyalties. The Kurds weren't Arab (they were Indo-European, and about 20 percent of the population), 60 percent of the Moslems were Shia (a sect considered heretical by the conservative mainline Sunnis). The Sunni Arabs may have been a minority, but they dominated commerce, government, education and running things in general. Since the 16th century, the Sunni Turks had relied on the Baghdadi Sunni Arabs to help run things.
In Iraq, one man's Mission Impossible A former Silicon Valley exec turned Pentagon boss wants to put Iraq back to work. But he's run into many roadblocks - including his own government. One of the little-known consequences of the American-led regime change four years ago was that most of the country's half-million industrial workers lost their jobs when the Baathist government, which had run the factories, collapsed. American administrators, who believed the Soviet-style system was antiquated, inefficient, and, well, socialist, had no interest in restarting the factories. Pure, unvarnished, American-style capitalism was the answer. But while waiting for Adam Smith, says Sabah al Khafaji, the director-general of the bus factory, some of his former workers joined the insurgency. "At least they paid," he says through a translator.Brinkley has another idea. A balding systems engineer with four patents to his name and backslapping Texas charm, he says his strategy isn't rocket science: If you have a decent job, you're less likely to plant a roadside bomb. But the implementation of that strategy has proved far more complicated and controversial than anyone expected. Money to get the factories restarted has been hard to come by. Finding buyers for the goods in the U.S. has been even harder (only one company, a small Memphis retailer, has signed on so far). And that's on top of the Herculean challenges of doing business in a war zone where electricity is erratic, supplies are scarce, and employees can get blown up on the way to work. Even people in his own government snipe at him. Brinkley has been called a "Stalinist" hell-bent on fixing a broken system and a "well-intentioned guy on a fool's errand." Of course, no one will confuse this place with a Toyota plant in Kentucky. The workers wear sandals, the machinery is from the 1970s, and most of the welding is still done by hand. The buses themselves probably wouldn't stand up to Western quality standards. Inside one of the coaches the screws don't seem fully secured, the welding appears uneven, and the upholstery doesn't fit. "We are in the Stone Age," says one worker, putting down his Russian-made drill. He refuses to give his name for fear of being singled out by the insurgents: "No good can come from talking to Americans." Brinkley was there that day to hand al Khafaji a check for $1.5 million - or at least an oversized ceremonial version of one - so that he can buy new machinery. "What's the alternative?" Brinkley asks. "We've been at this for four years. A free market hasn't emerged. You've got over 50% unemployment. Can't we take it as table stakes that mass unemployment creates social unrest? If you're not going to try to put everybody back to work anyway you can, what do you do? Just pull out and leave them unemployed and angry?"
U.S. Shifts Iraq Focus As Local Tactics Gain The Bush administration is quietly moving toward a major shift in Iraq policy, driven by successes in formerly intractable insurgent strongholds combined with dispiriting failures at fostering national reconciliation. After almost four years of trying to build Iraq's central government in Baghdad, the U.S. has found that what appears to work best in the divided country is just the opposite. So senior military officials are increasingly working to strengthen local players who are bringing some measure of stability to their communities. The new approach bears some striking similarities to the "soft partition" strategy pushed by senior Democrats, and suggests that despite the often bitter debate in Washington on Iraq policy, a broad consensus on how to move ahead in the war-torn country may be forming. senior military officials are worrying less about the dysfunctional central government that has been the focus of so much effort in the U.S. military and political strategy over the last three years. The change is the simple outgrowth of what the summer surge of more than 30,000 troops into Iraq has wrought. The U.S. has been most successful in areas where it has taken an intensely local approach, working with local leaders who share U.S. goals. The logical result of the new policy is a profound shift away from the Bush administration's original goal of building a multisectarian democracy in the heart of the Middle East. Instead, the new strategy seems likely to lead to an Iraq with a very weak central government and largely self-governing and homogenous regions. Over the long term the goal is to connect these local leaders to the central government by making them dependent on Baghdad for funds. To qualify for U.S. assistance, local groups must pledge loyalty to the central government, though many Sunni leaders who are working with the U.S. complain the Shiite dominated government is illegitimate.
Mahdi Militia Stymies U.S. Security Push U.S. commanders intent on building capable Iraqi security forces and a competent Iraqi government say their efforts are increasingly being stymied by the radical Shiite Mahdi Army. The group emerged in 2003 to defend Shiite neighborhoods from attacks by Sunni insurgents. Today, the Mahdi Army has infiltrated Iraq's government and society so deeply that the Americans are struggling to distinguish friend from foe. The militia's political arm controls several Iraqi ministries and is a fractious member of the Shiite-dominated ruling coalition in Baghdad. Yesterday its leader, the anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, ordered a six-month suspension of all Mahdi Army activities so that he can "rehabilitate" the force. U.S. officials say Mr. Sadr's announcement is an acknowledgment that the militia's rogue elements, which have attacked U.S. forces, Sunnis and even moderate Shiites, are sapping support for his movement among Iraqis.
16Sep07
The Petraeus-Crocker Testimony "Are we fixed yet?" House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton's question -- asked after Gen. David Petraeus' microphone failed to work -- is something of a metaphor both for Washington and Baghdad. That microphone failure at the start of Petraeus' dramatic congressional testimony is an ironic reminder. With their testimony, Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker are trying to get it fixed -- help repair and prepare America's politics. In an article published by The Weekly Standard on July 25, 2005, I wrote: "Al-Qaida's jihadists plotted a multigenerational war. That means we must fight a multi-administration war, which means bridging the whipsaw of the U.S. political cycle. ... The Bush administration has not prepared the nation for that -- at least not in any focused manner. And that omission constitutes negligence. However, Bush critics who advocate withdrawal are even more negligent, for withdrawal without ensuring Iraqi stability is a self-inflicted defeat leading to extremely dire consequences. " With the Petraeus-Crocker testimony, the Bush administration has finally begun to build that political bridge, albeit in an awkward, belated manner. The administration's Democratic opponents deserve no credit, however. These contemporary practitioners of the paranoid style in American politics have chosen angry theatrics and smear over common sense.
The next six to 12 months will determine if Petraeus and Crocker succeeded. If they do succeed, it will benefit both the Iraqi and American people, and ultimately benefit everyone on the planet who wants a more peaceful and prosperous 21st century.
AP Interview: Abizaid cites Iraq's needs It will take three to five years before Iraq's government is stable enough to operate on its own, according to the former commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East, who said the surge of American forces has not solved the country's broader problems. In an interview with The Associated Press, retired Army Gen. John Abizaid also said that beyond attacking the global threat of terrorism with military strength, the United States has done a poor job of applying the economic, political and diplomatic means to fight Islamic extremism. "I don't blame it on any people," Abizaid said Tuesday. "I just blame it on a bureaucratic system that has been unresponsive thus far to the challenges of the 21st century. We need to change that as a matter of national priority." Abizaid said none of the candidates hoping to replace President Bush can responsibly call for immediate or complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and other trouble spots around the globe. Too many other related issues are involved, he said, including the rise of Islamic extremism, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the need to preserve the flow of oil from the Middle East. Abizaid called these major and pressing issues to be addressed.
23Sep07
Gates Crafts Long-Term Iraq Plan, With Limited Role for U.S. Forces. Defense Secretary Seeks Bipartisan Agreement;
No Talk of DemocracyDefense Secretary Robert Gates sketched out a long-term vision for securing Iraq that includes a continuing American military force that is a fraction the size of the one there today, no permanent U.S. bases and a significant Navy and Air Force presence in the Persian Gulf region. In an interview in the Pentagon, Mr. Gates also said part of the long-range security structure would be stronger military partnerships with some of America's friends in the Gulf area, helping them build better counterterrorism forces as well as regional air- and missile-defense systems to check Iranian ambitions. What was missing from his vision for Iraq and the broader region was talk about transforming the region and spreading democracy. Instead, the Pentagon chief seemed much more focused on transforming the debate in Washington so the next president inherits a long-term strategy for Iraq and the region that both Republicans and Democrats can support. For now, that view seems to be translating into a much more pragmatic approach both on the ground in Iraq and back home. As recently as last year, U.S. war plans for Iraq focused on building a strong, multisectarian democracy that would serve as a model for the rest of the Middle East. With national reconciliation largely stalled, Mr. Gates and Gen. David Petraeus, the top commander in Iraq, have given local commanders greater latitude to forge alternative strategies that seek to stabilize specific regions across the country as the top priority -- even if it comes at the expense of a strong central government.
- The Education of Robert Gates Over the short term, Robert Gates is, to use a phrase he borrows from the historian Joseph Ellis, “improvising on the edge of catastrophe.” Robert Gates has been a godsend. After a bombastic defense secretary, we now have a candid one. After ego, we have self-effacement. After domination, we have a man who welcomes discussion. Gates was decisive during the Walter Reed hospital fiasco. He is honest and trustworthy on Iraq. And on Monday, at the World Forum on the Future of Democracy at the College of William and Mary here, Gates delivered a speech that could define the center ground of American foreign policy. He ran through the history of the never-ending debate between realists and idealists. He noted that this debate began just after the founding of the Republic. Thomas Jefferson saw the French Revolution as a triumph for liberty. John Adams saw it as reckless radicalism. Throughout the messy years that followed, Gates explained, we have made deals with tyrants to defeat other tyrants. We’ve championed human rights while doing business with some of the worst violators of human rights. “It is neither hypocrisy nor cynicism to believe fervently in freedom while adopting different approaches to advancing freedom at different times along the way,” Gates said.
Center First Gives Way to Center Last Have you noticed the change in the Iraq debate? Most American experts and policy makers wasted the past few years assuming that change in Iraq would come from the center and spread outward. They squandered months arguing about the benchmarks that would supposedly induce the Baghdad politicians to make compromises. They quibbled over whether this or that prime minister was up to the job. They unrealistically imagined that peace would come through some grand Sunni-Shiite reconciliation. Now, at long last, the smartest analysts and policy makers are starting to think like sociologists. They are finally acknowledging that the key Iraqi figures are not in the center but in the provinces and the tribes. Peace will come to the center last, not to the center first. Stability will come not through some grand reconciliation but through the agglomeration of order, tribe by tribe and street by street. The big change in the debate has come about because the surge failed, and it failed in an unexpected way. The original idea behind the surge was that U.S. troops would create enough calm to allow the national politicians to make compromises. The surge was intended to bolster the “modern” — meaning nonsectarian and nontribal — institutions in the country. But the surge is failing, at least politically, because there are practically no nonsectarian institutions, and there are few nonsectarian leaders to create them. Security gains have not led to political gains. At the same time, something unexpected happened. As Iraqi national politics stagnated, the tribes began to take the initiative.
30Sep07
IRAQ: The Choice Corruption, and the "culture of theft" is a major impediment to peace in Iraq. Too many Iraqis are eager to steal, and see this as a worthy way to achieve financial security. Most Iraqis profess to admire honesty and hard work. But for decades, there has been only Saddam's Sunni Arab thugs, stealing whatever they wanted. They even stole from each other, forcing Saddam to judge which thief would keep what. One nasty side effect of all this is the widespread belief that the Sunni Arabs are superior fighters and killers. This was all Shia Arabs saw for many years. Attempts to fight back were met with savage reprisals. Now, Shia Arabs see Sunni Arabs, even friendly ones, as a threat that must be eliminated. When Americans berate Iraqi officials for not getting Sunni and Shia to work together, it doesn't register. Most Shia want the Sunni Arabs dead, or gone. Reconciliation isn't even on the list of possibilities. Tell the Americans what they want to hear, and keep going after the Sunni Arabs
Iraq's Top Sunni Visits Shiite Cleric Iraq's Sunni vice president held a rare meeting Thursday with the country's top Shiite cleric to seek support for a 25-point blueprint for political reform, the latest effort by both Islamic sects to promote unity amid unrelenting violence. Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi said Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani praised his initiative during their two-hour meeting in the holy city of Najaf, 100 miles south of Baghdad. The reclusive Shiite spiritual leader has previously met with Sunni clerics, but it was his first meeting with a senior government official. "He generally blesses the initiative," Mr. Hashemi said, saying he found Mr. Sistani politically "neutral" and eager to promote national unity. Mr. Sistani has played a key role in shaping the political future of Iraq following the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime and wields considerable influence over Shiite politicians and their followers. The blueprint, which Mr. Hashemi called the Iraqi National Compact, stressed basic democratic principles such as respect for human rights, equality before the law, the sanctity of places of worship, prohibition of the use of force to attain political goals, filling government jobs according to merit and keeping the army and police above sectarian or political affiliations. It also proposed a blanket pardon for Iraqis who took up arms against the government and the U.S.-led coalition forces in exchange for laying down their arms and joining the political process. And it included a nod to Iraq's Kurds, stating that "pending" issues could be "resolved through compromise," a reference to the disputed Kurdish claim to the oil-rich northern city of Kirkuk.
Why We're Winning Now in Iraq Many politicians and pundits in Washington have ignored perhaps the most important point made by Gen. David Petraeus in his recent congressional testimony: The defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq requires a combination of conventional forces, special forces and local forces. This realization has profound implications not only for American strategy in Iraq, but also for the future of the war on terror. As Gen. Petraeus made clear, the adoption of a true counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq in January 2007 has led to unprecedented progress in the struggle against al Qaeda in Iraq, by protecting Sunni Arabs who reject the terrorists among them from the vicious retribution of those terrorists. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly Wednesday, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki also touted the effectiveness of this strategy while at the same time warning of al Qaeda in Iraq's continued threat to his government and indeed the entire region. Yet despite the undeniable successes the new strategy has achieved against al Qaeda in Iraq, many in Congress are still pushing to change the mission of U.S. forces back to a counterterrorism role relying on special forces and precision munitions to conduct targeted attacks on terrorist leaders. This year has been a different story in Anbar, and elsewhere in Iraq. The influx of American forces in support of a counterinsurgency strategy -- more than 4,000 went into Anbar -- allowed U.S. commanders to take hold of the local resentment against al Qaeda by promising to protect those who resisted the terrorists. When American forces entered al Qaeda strongholds like Arab Jabour, the first question the locals asked is: Are you going to stay this time? They wanted to know if the U.S. would commit to protecting them against al Qaeda retribution.
Oct07/Nov07/Dec07
LEADERSHIP: Scarce Iraqi Sergeants Urgently Sought The biggest leadership problem the Iraqi military has is with NCOs (noncommissioned officers, or sergeants). In the Saddam era force, the Soviet style of leadership was used. That is, sergeants had much less authority and responsibility than they do in Western forces. The new Iraqi army was built on the Western model, and for that to work, NCOs were needed. During World War II, as Western armies expanded enormously and rapidly (the U.S. Army went from 150,000 to over nine million in four years). This worked because the United States had employed capable and responsible NCOs for over a century. It was part of the culture. Every kid had at least a vague idea of what sergeants did, and it was not difficult to create several million new corporals and sergeants in four years. Iraq did not have this tradition, so U.S. and NATO trainers had to start from scratch. After four years of effort..
IRAQ: Waiting For A Miracle To Show Up The sharp drop in violence (about 70 percent nationwide versus a year ago) is being seen as the result of the Sunni Arab terrorist organizations collapsing in defeat. Most of the Sunni Arab tribes have turned against the terrorists, and the al Qaeda organization, which is responsible for most of the suicide bomb attacks, has been torn apart. Most al Qaeda leaders are dead, captured or spending most of their time trying to avoid that fate. The system of safe houses and skilled technicians (bomb makers, trainers, supervisors) has been disrupted or destroyed. Before the Summer ended, it was possible to shift many American combat units to the battle against Shia warlords. There are two of these, both backed by Iran; the Badr Brigades, and the Mahdi Army. While Iranian backed, the two organizations are still Iraqi, and keen to see a strong and independent Iraq (run by a religious dictatorship, with one of the two warlords pulling strings behind the scenes.)
WINNING: Bin Laden Admits Defeat in Iraq On October 22nd, Osama bin Laden admitted that al Qaeda had lost its war in Iraq. In an audiotape speech titled "Message to the people of Iraq," bin Laden complains of disunity and poor use of resources. He admits that al Qaeda made mistakes, and that all Sunni Arabs must unite to defeat the foreigners and Shia Moslems. What bin Laden is most upset about is the large number of Sunni Arab terrorists who have switched sides in Iraq. This has actually been going on for a while. Tribal leaders and warlords in the west (Anbar province) have been turning on terrorist groups, especially al Qaeda, for several years. While bin Laden appeals for unity, he shows only a superficial appreciation of what is actually going on in Iraq. Al Qaeda?s Score Card …
The Empty Chair at the Iraq Hearings Effective foreign policy requires paying close attention to economics, not just security and politics. Policy often falters in practice because the economic or financial aspect is overlooked.Recall the hearings on Capitol Hill in September concerning progress in Iraq. Testifying on security issues was Gen. David Petraeus, offering his expertise on counterinsurgency warfare in theory and in practice. Next to him was Ambassador Ryan Crocker, able to answer virtually any question, no matter how detailed, on the political machinations within Iraq. And next to them was the seasoned expert on economic issues in Iraq. Oops. Actually, no one was next to them. An empty chair, perhaps. But had an expert been at the witness table, the testimony might have gone. . . . Empty Chair: I am happy to report that the central bank has implemented the recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton commission in this area. It has raised the interest rate all the way to 20 percent to control inflation, and through such actions the inflation rate has come down sharply. The new Iraqi dinar, which was introduced in 2003, has proved popular and has appreciated nicely in the past year. The Central Bank of Iraq now has $21 billion in reserves, many times more than it had just after Saddam Hussein stole a billion dollars from its vaults in March 2003. This summer the Baghdad Stock Exchange opened to foreign investors, rose 85 percent in July and held its own in August. As the closely watched Grant's Interest Rate Observer noted Sept. 7, "Iraq has turned into a capital magnet. . . . Money is sometimes misinformed, but it is never insincere. Something is afoot in Iraq." So there are measurable signs of economic and financial progress.
Bob Dylan's "The Times They are A'Changin" (btw the other title reference is to George Carlin). Take a listen because it sets the table for a lot of my reactions and reflections and may do so for you as well. Before we go there though there are several other things worth pointing to as well.
