Iraq Resartus (Readings): Stability, Progress and Will
It's time for another slightly deep dive on Iraq, both for its' own sake and for the value of the
lessons learnable. We say learnable because the lessons are there if one wants to pay attention to them. Or one can focus on the popular mythology that's grown up under political pressures and partisan posturing. In actual point of fact something of a miracle has occurred but we'll get to that and our reasons for saying. Let's start with this fascinating appearance on the Rose program of Meghan O'Sullivan who served on the NSC for Iraq and is now at the Kennedy School. She lays out a balanced, informed and "feet-on-the-ground" assessment of where we were and the challenges facing us. Interestingly, and evidence for the learnability conundrum, is that it was a rather low-rated show, despite the balance and honesty on a critically important issue.
Eine Kleine Nachthistorische...a Little Night History
Just to review the bidding we'll make three points. First, as a counter-factual. Saddam was undoing the sanctions rather rapidly leveraging Oil-for-Food, corrupting politicians around the world and enlisting the support of both France and Russia. He did in fact have a weapons program if no inventory that was re-startable and scalable and he did have extensive contacts with terrorists. And for those who further forget their history we'd had an extensive no-fly near-combat and troops on the ground for a decade and to get his grudging appearances of new cooperation put 140,000 troops on his borders. Unsustainable.
Second we conducted a brief, lightening fast and brilliant blitzkrieg to seize the country, remove Saddam and turn it over to a civilian government. And therein lies the most fundamental problem. But we should also mention that leading up to the war we struggled with the diplomatic air cover which was nowhere near as good as it should be but also not much worse, given the aforementioned corruption, than it could be. We didn't lay out a clear and motivating national objective and instead used the WMD maneuver instead of laying out the true depth and breadth of the challenges. And third we completely mis-judged the nature of the problem, the fundamental problem. There was no government, stable socio-politico class or other source of potential "turnover". Instead Iraq collapsed into a primitive tribal state. No you can wave your arms all you want about those failures - and we have - but it's also fair to say nobody could have estimated the true depth of dysfunction that Saddam had created. Much worse than Stalin in the old Soviet Union. What was needed was an "American Caesar" to go in, assume supreme authority and re-build the institutional infrastructure of the country. Much as we did in Japan or Germany after WW2. Only it took us almost two years to come to that realization.
Third, and there's the ebb-n-flow of the Baathist/alQuada insurgency, the overt and covert subversion of Iraqi stability by Iran and the diabolically clever triggerring of Shia-Sunni conflict by alQ. Clever not brilliant because their intransigence, cruelty and abuse eventually led to their complete rejection by the people. Who in fact do want a better society. As a sidenote btw we'd also mention the notion of a Rat Trap - for everybody who claims we neglected Afghanistan we'll point out that every nutjob who wanted to be a Jihadi terrorist who might have had to be hunted down in those mountains they all came to Iraq, got themselves killed and, with their indifference to civilian lives, alienated the Arab street across the ME. Net net not bad in the cruel calculus that applies. Nontheless we made two further major mistakes, that built on the vacuum mis-understanding. We approached the tactics and strategy via the lens of conventional warfare and we completely ignored and neglected the real nature of Iraqi culture and the role of tribes.
And Then a Miracle Occurs
The miracle is that we completely re-thought, re-tooled and re-directed our policy, strategy, tactics and training. The military that when into Iraq had learned the lessons of nation-building and counter-insurgency multiple times, most recently on this scale in Nam. As an old military history buff I spent a lot of time reading up on all that but never realized that as soon as they disengaged all those painfully bought lessons were thrown away to return to their roots of heavy armored warfare. Worse yet, as we've learned, the senior leadership of the Army during that era learned and knew the lessons of COIN but was never able to change the institution at the time.
As Jim Stockdale points out in his book, "Philosophical Fighter Pilot" the greatest difficulty, calling for the most profound moral courage and leadership, is not to just admit when you're wrong. It's to stick with the problem and it's metastasized new forms and figure out what to do with the real situation. Not only the Army refused to change. Worse people, especially, like McNamara realized in '67 that they were wrong. And refused to adapt thru an utter failure of moral courage and leadership responsibilities. One should view "Fog of War" as the apologia of a man who sent thousands to their deaths because he failed in his duties.
Well we've learned, adopted, adapted and changed. We've previously discussed the work of Col. David Kilcullen who was instrumental in this process. For a fair and balanced assessment of the situation his Rose appearance is as good as it gets and perfectly complements O'Sullivan's. But if you read/look at no other thing take a look at his presentation to the COIN think tank of the US Army: Kilcullen’s Presentation on COIN and Iraq (!!!!!).
It doesn't get any better than that in terms of lessons, history, assessment, examples and the role of "kinetics" vs the other 90%. To give you a flavor we've extracted a couple of his charts. Which use Iraq as their case but look back widely at all the history of COIN operations and draw on everybody from Lawrence on down. Kilcullen lays out a complete framework for what it takes to establish peach and security, how old cultures and societies break under the lack, how economic and socio-political initiatives have to function and some specific lessons. Here's the real rub: the framework works to understand, analyze and strategize any effort to build a peaceful and prosperous society. In fact it not only applies to other nation-building challenges, e.g. Africa, but could serve as a useful platform for understanding, suitably adapted, of the challenges facing the leaderships of Russia or China. Or for that matter ourselves as we wrestle with re-building our own inner cities.
This second chart more specifically lays out the multiple layers of effort required from Counter-Terror to Count-Insurgency to Peace-keeping Operations to true Nation-building. Fortunately our inner city challenges aren't as dire as the top two layers but sure bear a lot of resemblance to the bottom one. And when people keep urging us to go into Darfur it's not going to be solved with a few "Western" troops. In fact that's as naive, arrogant and wrong a mis-conception as the nay-sayers always claimed Kipling was. If you want to know how well he understood things from Kilcullen's perspective and how little the wishful thinkers get it go read some of his poetry.(Kitchener's School)
As you skim over the readings below please keep all this in mind. The standard popular mythology and MSM reporting has gotten the recent efforts by the Iraqi central government to supress the Sadrists completely wrong. In fac this is one of the single most encouraging things to have happened in Iraq since the beginning. It shows that first off the Sunni west is coming into the fold and beginning to rejoin the government and the society. So that, secondly, supression of the most dangerous Shia power-seekers can now absorb the efforts and resources of a newly confident central authority who was able to use a newly built and hugely more competent national security force. And that Iran, the proximate source of the problem, is now on the table to be dealth with. As Kilcullen points out we've got a long way to go to get a stable, secure, peaceful and prosoperous Iraq. But a lot of the right things are slowly moving into place and we're more on the right path than we've evern been.
IRAQ
IRAQ: Mahdi Army Fades Away After a month of fighting, the Mahdi Army has disappeared from the
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streets of Basra, the largest city in the south. The army and police are everywhere, and people are providing information on where Mahdi Army personnel are hiding out, and the locations of their weapons caches. Up north, in the Sadr City section of east Baghdad, the Mahdi Army is still fighting hard. But the army and police have the upper hand, and are pushing the Shia militiamen back block by block. Mahdi Army leader Muqtada al Sadr has responded by threatening to order his men to go after American troops if the government does not back off. That's won't work, because the Mahdi Army is not particularly skillful, and not very united either. He recently ordered his troops to stop fighting Iraqi soldiers and police, and concentrate on the Americans. The Iraqi security forces have not reciprocated, and continue coming after the Mahdi Army. Meanwhile, Sunni Arab politicians have returned to the government. These Sunni Arab political parties had walked out of the government nine months ago, angry over the failure to guarantee their rights, safety and share of the oil revenue. Since then, the Sunni Arab terrorism effort has been shattered, with many of the Sunni Arab terror groups switched sides and joined the war against al Qaeda.
U.S. and Iran Find Common Ground in Iraq’s Shiite Conflict In the Iraqi government’s fight to subdue the Shiite militia of Moktada al-Sadr in the southern city of Basra, perhaps nothing reveals the complexities of the Iraq conflict more starkly than this: Iran and the United States find themselves on the same side. The causes of this convergence boil down to the logic of self-interest, although it is logic in a place where even the most basic reasoning refuses to go in a straight line. In essence, though, the calculation by the United States is that it must back the government it helped to create and take the steps needed to protect American troops and civilian officials. Iranian motivations appear to hinge on the possibility that Mr. Sadr’s political and military followers could gain power in provincial elections this fall, and disrupt the creation of a semiautonomous region in the south that the Iranians see as beneficial. The American-Iranian convergence is all the more remarkable because of mutual animosity. Although there are many groups in Iraq — Shiite and Sunni, Turkmen and Kurd — it is a majority Shiite country, and in the end the geopolitical calculus of the United States and Iran has to do with what kind of Shiite government they want in control. The party that Iran and the United States are backing, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, is a bitter rival of Mr. Sadr’s political movement and has managed to play to the interests of both countries. Under Iraq’s Constitution, provinces can form regions with considerable independence from Baghdad. The Supreme Council advocates a large, semiautonomous region in the south, similar to Kurdistan in the north, made up of the nine southern provinces.
Back to Basra: Challenging the Blunderbusses Today, Maliki and Iraqis in general have earned the right to sneer at such instant and shallow media negativism, for Knights Charge (code name for the anti-Shia gang offensive in Basra and southern Iraq) is proving to be an extraordinarily significant political and military operation with rather heady long-term payoffs. That's key -- understanding Knights Charge is an integrated political-military operation. Maliki made it clear that this multidimensional operation was planned and executed by the Iraqis themselves and that the United States was not consulted. Even attempting Knights Charge signals increasing Iraqi confidence in their own capacities. Confidence does not ensure competence -- cockiness can get you killed -- but experienced military trainers and teachers know achieving trainee or student competence requires building confidence. Knights Charge, however, was much more than a confidence-building measure; it may be the most decisive example of a country-building measure we have seen since Saddam fell in April 2003. Fierce Iraq Kurd and Sunni Arab political support for Knights Charge has strengthened Maliki's government -- that's nation-building by the Iraqis themselves. I believe this was the Iraqi government's key strategic domestic objective. In over their heads or a heady move? Knights Charge demonstrates the Iraqi democratic government's expanding reach and increasing effectiveness. Iran's mullah dictatorship will always try to destabilize Iraq, that's a given. But now Tehran says publicly it supports the Iraqi government's counterinsurgent efforts.
Iraq's Maliki says factions agree to rejoin government Parties that walked out of Iraq's government last year have agreed to rejoin, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki said on Thursday, in what could amount to a long-awaited political breakthrough. The main Sunni Arab bloc, the Accordance Front, said it intended to submit a list of candidates for cabinet positions within days and could be back in Maliki's government soon. Its return has been a major goal of the United States. But Maliki also repeated a warning that militia groups must disarm, a sign he is unlikely to reconcile quickly with Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and his political movement. The Front's exit following a range of policy disagreements left Maliki's cabinet with mainly Shi'ites and Kurds. It set back efforts to draw Sunni Arabs, who had been dominant under the late dictator Saddam Hussein, closer into the political process and away from Iraq's insurgency and sectarian bloodshed, in which tens of thousands of Iraqis have been killed. A return of the Front would also be a major political boost for Maliki at a time when he is trying to isolate the Sadrists, who argue the crackdown on militias is an attempt to sideline them ahead of provincial elections in October. Sadr pulled his six ministers from Maliki's government a year ago after Maliki refused to set a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.
Iraq Team to Discuss Militias With Iran Iraqi officials have previously traveled to Iran, but this appears to be the first time that an elite delegation has been dispatched to take up reports of Iranian intervention. In recent weeks, President Bush and other American officials have complained about what they say is a growing Iranian role in arming, training and financing antigovernment Shiite militias. Iraqi military officials said their forces discovered a large cache of Iranian-made arms in Basra several weeks ago, in the course of the Maliki government’s offensive against militia groups there.Some had markings indicating they were made this year, according to American military officials. The Green Zone in Baghdad, which is the seat of the Iraqi government and the site of the American Embassy, has regularly come under fire from Iranian-made rockets. Many Iraqi Shiites, including officers in the military, resent Tehran’s efforts to influence events in Iraq, which they say are aimed at undermining the government. But many others, who spent years in exile in Iran, see a country that is also deeply connected to Iraq, through religious bonds and kinship ties. And some Shiite political parties have received considerable support from Iran. Speaking to Al Arabiya, Mr. Maliki stressed that his diplomacy should not be seen as a slap at the Iranians. “It must not be interpreted as if it’s a turn against Iran, and then I was dragged into clashes with the Sadr movement,” he said. However, in the same interview, he warned “all those who interfere in Iraqi affairs” and specifically mentioned Iran.
IRAN: It Wasn't Me With the collapse of Sunni Arab terror groups in Iraq, the biggest source of attacks on U.S. and Iraqi troops has become Shia Arab groups (like the Mahdi Army). These are backed by Iran (with cash, weapons and technical experts). Recently, the Iraqi government sent a group of Shia politicians to Iran, to try and get this terrorism support stopped. The Iraqis brought with them evidence (documents, names, photos). The Iranians denied everything and sent the Iraqi politicians packing. Meanwhile, some members of the ruling elite in Iran are speaking openly about what a bad thing such interference is, but will not come right out and name names, much less insist that the Quds Force be reined in. The Iranian government did say that shutting down the Shia militias in Iraq was a good things. The Iraqi government took the hint (that the Quds Force activities was an internal matter for Iran), and stopped complaining openly. At least for now. But to make their point, the Iraqis turned around and supported the United Arab Emirates in a dispute with Iran over ownership of three Persian Gulf islands. In response, Iran recalled its ambassador to Iraq. The Gulf Arabs, who are largely Sunni, see Iraq as suspect because most of the population is Shia (as are nearly all Iranians). But this backing of their fellow Arabs, over the islands dispute, makes Iraq "one of us (Arabs)." Despite the religious affinity, Iraqis tend to come down on the side of being an Arab, and anti-Iranian (Iranians are not Arab, but ethnic cousins of Europeans and Indians), when it really counts. The U.S. (not to mentioned Palestinians, Israelis, Egyptians and Lebanese) are also upset about Iranian support of Hizbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. These two groups are recognized terrorist organizations, and are the recipients of cash, weapons and technical experts from Iran. Officially, the Iranian government denies all this, but radical elements in the government are less shy about admitting to it. Thus the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Quds Force are an embarrassment to the government, especially when these radicals boats of their mischief in Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq and elsewhere. For example, Iran has been backing the Lebanese Shia Hizbollah group in its efforts to take control of the Lebanese government. This has recently led to open combat between Hizbollah and Lebanese government forces. Iran denies any involvement, it always does.
Perseverance Pays Off in Baghdad The recent violence in Sadrist areas of Baghdad should not distract us from the big picture. The capital city of Iraq is immensely more at peace than it was a year ago. This time last year, there were deep booms and the rattle of extended firefights from virtually all around the compass throughout the day and night. Such incidents are now a rare occurrence in a week. Some of the reasons for this progress are better known than others. The surge, the Awakening Councils and the neighborhood-based counterinsurgency program have received solid credit. But the condign effects of the Iraqis' own Baghdad Services Committee and Popular Mobilization Committee have garnered little attention outside Iraq, perhaps because they are led by Ahmed Chalabi, the returned exile who is far more controversial abroad than at home. Yet these days the committees' weekly government-level meetings are attended by ministers and American and Iraqi generals from David Petraeus on down. The Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC) was launched in February 2007. It now supervises the activity of some 3,000 volunteers around Baghdad. They, in turn, operate a localized system of 120 neighborhood watch committees. They provide intelligence, report trouble, help settle returnees to their homes and the like. They have been crucial in stabilizing the city neighborhood by neighborhood. The BSC has gained a considerable reputation around Baghdad for taking government ministers into neglected areas, television cameras in tow, to shame the government into action. Mr. Chalabi's political party, the Iraqi National Congress, also recently launched a weekly newspaper entirely about services, in which citizens get to sound off and government officials are asked to respond. The practical projects of these committees aside, one could argue that their greatest service has been psychological: to show that the problems of Baghdad, and by implication Iraq, are not some bottomless pit of chaos. They can be dealt with concretely and overcome with perseverance.
How We'll Know When We've Won Virtually everyone who wants to win this war agrees: Success will have been achieved when Iraq is a stable, representative state that controls its own territory, is oriented toward the West, and is an ally in the struggle against militant Islamism, whether Sunni or Shia. This has been said over and over. Why won't war critics hear it? Is it because they reject the notion that such success is achievable and therefore see the definition as dishonest or delusional? Is it because George Bush has used versions of it and thus discredited it in the eyes of those who hate him? Or is it because it does not offer easily verifiable benchmarks to tell us whether or not we are succeeding? There could be other reasons--perhaps critics fear that even thinking about success or failure in Iraq will weaken their demand for an immediate "end to the war." Whatever the explanation for this tiresome deafness, here is one more attempt to flesh out what success in Iraq means and how we can evaluate progress toward it.
Let's 'Surge' Some More It is said that generals always fight the last war. But when David Petraeus came to town it was senators – on both sides of the aisle – who battled over the Iraq war of 2004-2006. That war has little in common with the war we are fighting today. I may well have spent more time embedded with combat units in Iraq than any other journalist alive. I have seen this war – and our part in it – at its brutal worst. And I say the transformation over the last 14 months is little short of miraculous. The change goes far beyond the statistical decline in casualties or incidents of violence. A young Iraqi translator, wounded in battle and fearing death, asked an American commander to bury his heart in America. Iraqi special forces units took to the streets to track down terrorists who killed American soldiers. The U.S. military is the most respected institution in Iraq, and many Iraqi boys dream of becoming American soldiers. Yes, young Iraqi boys know about "GoArmy.com." Equally misguided were some senators' attempts to use Gen. Petraeus's statement, that there could be no purely military solution in Iraq, to dismiss our soldiers' achievements as "merely" military. In a successful counterinsurgency it is impossible to separate military and political success. The Sunni "awakening" was not primarily a military event any more than it was "bribery." It was a political event with enormous military benefits. The huge drop in roadside bombings is also a political success – because the bombings were political events. It is not possible to bury a tank-busting 1,500-pound bomb in a neighborhood street without the neighbors noticing. Since the military cannot watch every road during every hour of the day (that would be a purely military solution), whether the bomb kills soldiers depends on whether the neighbors warn the soldiers or cover for the terrorists.
Michael Yon's "Moment of Truth in Iraq" Michael Yon is one of those unusual Americans who emerge in wartime to do the jobs that need to be done. The job he is doing is covering combat in Iraq at the gritty, confusing and valiant level of close combat, and doing so with honesty, passion and professional expertise. His new book, "Moment of Truth in Iraq
," testifies to that. Yon isn't World War II's Ernie Pyle, he's the Global War on Terror's Michael Yon. This is a different war with a very different media environment. Yon "self-embedded" with U.S. combat units in 2005 -- paying his own way and getting donations through his Website michaelyon-online.com. Given the Internet and digital technology, it isn't really surprising that emails and Web logs (blogs) have been the richest sources of detailed, day-to-day combat reporting. Yon is part of this new media environment. His technique, however, is Pyle's -- be there with the troops, with the Iraqis, in the vehicles, on foot patrols, in the alleys and in the homes, then tell what happened and tell it well. Yon writes: "I prefer to write what I see with my own eyes in the streets and on the battlefield, to paint a picture as intimate and rich in detail as I can, and then ... let the reader come to his own understanding." Twice already I've read out loud the following passage from "Moment of Truth" in its entirety, and both times my small audience asked, "Why don't we hear more stories like this?"