Parts to Wholes: the Socionomic Systems Nexus

Perspectives

A discussion about the escalating conflict between Georgia and Russia with Robert Kagan of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Stephen Sestanovich of the Council of Foreign Relations .

An update on the conflict between Georgia and Russia with Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative (Ambassador) of the Russian Federation.

Interactive Map (WSJ), Complete coverage (WSJ)

Worldwide Political Cartoons

Information Warfare: The Big Lie Returns February 14, 2008: Russia is recycling the Vietnam era Information War campaign, that convinced a lot of people that the CIA was using the war as a means to export heroin from Myanmar (when it was called Burma, and was the major source of that drug). Now the Russians are telling anyone who will listen, that the CIA is transporting most of the Afghan heroin out of Afghanistan aboard U.S. Air Force transports. Back in the 1960s, some of the Burmese drug lords exported their heroin through Vietnam, and bribed whoever they could to move the stuff. Since then, China and Burma shut down the heroin gangs along their mutual border, and production moved to Pakistan, where it was tolerated for a while, then chased across the border to Afghanistan in the 1990s. The Russians pushed the story that it was the CIA that set up the heroin trade in Pakistan, as a way to get the drug to Soviet soldiers fighting in Afghanistan. The target wasn't the Russian soldiers, but the larger Russian population. Today, there are millions of Russian heroin addicts, and Russian gangsters move tons of it through Russia into Western Europe.

• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maskirovka
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Big_Lie

Mainstream Coverage and Analysis

War in the Caucasus Georgian mistakes, and Russian imperialism. "War has started," Vladimir Putin said yesterday as Georgian and Russian forces fought over the breakaway Georgian region of South Ossetia. War is certainly what the two countries have seemed to want for some time, and the chances of avoiding a drawn-out conflict now are slim. It's unclear at this stage which side is more at fault for the current fighting. Georgia says it moved on the South Ossetian city of Tskhinvali yesterday after rebels there broke a cease-fire. But President Mikheil Saakashvili has long pledged to retake South Ossetia and another separatist area, Abkhazia, and may have underestimated Moscow's reaction. Within hours, Russian tanks crossed the border to bolster Russian "peacekeepers" who have been stirring up trouble in the two regions. Georgia says Russian airplanes bombed Tskhinvali, reversing some Georgian army gains there, as well as air fields in nonseparatist areas. The Georgian air force claims to have shot down at least five Russian planes. The biggest question now is whether Moscow will simply try to restore the previous status quo in South Ossetia -- with Russia and the rebels controlling most of the territory -- or go further and crush Georgia while deposing Mr. Saakashvili. Russian state TV yesterday reported that Georgian soldiers had killed at least 10 Russian troops and were "finishing off" wounded Russians, a worrisome sign that the Kremlin is trying to inflame public opinion ahead of a major operation. The markets clearly think this is more than a blip; the benchmark Russian stock index shed 6.5% to hit its lowest level since November 2006.

Conflict Not All Russia's Fault Russia has massively overreacted to the situation in Georgia. It has hit targets across Georgia, well beyond South Ossetia, and has killed both Georgian military personnel as well as civilians. The international community is right to condemn this illegal attack on an independent country and United Nations member. But this is not a repeat of the Soviet Union's aggressive behavior of the last century. So far at least, Russia's aims have been clear: to oust Georgian forces from the territory of South Ossetia, one of two secessionist enclaves in Georgia, and to chasten a Saakashvili government that Russia perceives as hot-headed and unpredictable. Regardless of the conflict's origins, the West must continue to act diplomatically to push Georgia and Russia back to the pre-attacks status quo. The United States should make it clear that Saakashvili has seriously miscalculated the meaning of his partnership with Washington, and that Georgia and Russia must step back before they do irreparable damage to their relations with the US, NATO, and the European Union. The attack on South Ossetia, along with Russia's inexcusable reaction, have pushed both sides down the road toward all-out war – a war that could ignite a host of other territorial and ethnic disputes in the Caucasus as a whole.

• Wounded Pride Ignites an Accidental War, Wounded Pride Ignites an Accidental War
• Crisis in South Ossetia, Red Alert Intelligence Guidance: The Crisis in Georgia (Free Access)
• RUSSIA: Why Georgia Lost The War

Russian Offensive in Georgia Imperils U.S. Strategic Aims on Iran, Energy Russia's military campaign in Georgia may threaten the U.S. strategic aims of preventing Iran from building a nuclear bomb and securing Central Asian energy supplies for Europe. The Russian-Georgian fighting ``will imperil U.S.-Russian diplomacy no matter what,'' said Cliff Kupchan of New York-based Eurasia Group, a political risk consulting firm. The U.S. and European reactions will make Russia ``more obstinate at the Security Council,'' where President George W. Bush seeks to impose tougher United Nations sanctions on the Iranian government, he said. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev today ordered a halt to the five-day offensive, saying Russia had achieved its goals and punished the Georgian ``aggressor.'' Georgia's role in a U.S.-backed energy corridor to Europe for oil and natural gas from former Soviet areas of Central Asia, a route that skirts Russia, may be in doubt. That strategy counted on Russia respecting Georgia's sovereignty.

Bush returned from the Olympic Games in China and expressed concerns that Russian forces may be engaged in an effort ``to depose Georgia's duly elected government.'' Beyond being a democratic ally, Georgia is a link in a U.S.- backed southern energy corridor that connects the Caspian Sea region with world markets, bypassing Russia. The BP Plc-led Baku- Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline is a major part of that route and runs about 60 miles (100 kilometers) south of the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali. Robert Johnson, a specialist in energy at the Eurasia Group, said Georgia's reputation as a viable, alternative route for transporting oil and gas from Turkmenistan and elsewhere has been ``compromised'' because of the conflict.

Russian Assault in Georgia Threatens New Cold War: Matthew Lynn Russia is threatening a new Cold War by dispatching troops to the independent state of Georgia. The trouble is, there isn't much reason to think it will do better this time around than it did in its Cold War with the U.S. and the West last century. We will all be poorer if there is more tension between Russia and the rest of the world. And Russia will suffer most of all. The main facts of the conflict are clear enough. Russia sent its soldiers into the breakaway Georgian region of South Ossetia after Georgian soldiers started an offensive. According to Medvedev, Georgia was starting ``genocide'' there. Russian troops went in to protect ethnic Russians. Russia may be aggrieved that Georgia is part of the U.S.- backed ``southern energy corridor'' that connects the Caspian Sea region with world markets, bypassing Russia. It wants to use oil as a way of re-asserting its great-power status. That, surely, is a mistake of historical proportions. It should be using its oil wealth to rebuild its infrastructure and education system, creating a modern economy, one that can still prosper after we have all switched to running our cars on nuclear-powered and wind-generated electricity. It doesn't matter to Russia whether Georgia shares in the region's oil wealth any more than it mattered to Britain that the Norwegians also controlled a lot of the oil in the North Sea. What matters is using the oil money to build your own economy. Russia lost the last Cold War and will lose this one as well, if tensions continue. It doesn't have the money or the manpower, and without guns, steel and bodies, all wars, whether cold or hot, are eventually lost. Russia will postpone its integration into the developed world by a generation or more -- and both sides will be the poorer for that. Russia May Turn Focus to Pro-U.S. Ukraine After Army Offensive in Georgia

Russia occupies Georgia, world pressure mounts Russian troops and armor deployed around three Georgian towns on Thursday, as international pressure mounted on Moscow over its continuing occupation of parts of Georgia. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said he was "extremely concerned" about the humanitarian situation in Georgia and called for a halt to lawlessness. In the key Georgian town of Gori, west of the capital Tbilisi, correspondents saw signs of looting which locals blamed on militias from the neighboring province of South Ossetia, where the conflict erupted a week ago. Russian armed forces have occupied parts of Georgia since repelling a Georgian attack last week on the tiny pro-Russian separatist territory of South Ossetia, which threw off Tbilisi's control in the 1990s. Shops had been smashed up in Gori and there were very few parked cars. "They were stealing cars and breaking into shops," Vasily, 72, said. "They spoke Ossetian."The Russians have pledged to stop looting but men wearing an assortment of camouflaged uniforms stole cars from journalists and from the United Nations on Thursday and a hidden sniper shot at a female Georgian television correspondent, grazing her arm. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili said Russia was behind a "deliberate policy of ethnic cleansing." "I can prove it with the international organizations already bringing testimony to what I'm saying," he said in English at a briefing for foreign media. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, the architect of a two-day old ceasefire, said U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice would visit Tbilisi on Friday to secure Georgia's signature to a peace deal which would "consolidate" the halt to fighting. "If tomorrow Mr Saakashvili signs the document that we have negotiated with (Russian President) Mr Medvedev, then the withdrawal of Russian troops can begin," Sarkozy said. But Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said: "We can forget about talks on Georgia's territorial integrity because it's impossible to force South Ossetia and Abkhazia to agree that they can be returned into Georgia's fold by force." In a sharp warning, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Washington's relationship with Russia could be "adversely affected for years to come" unless the Kremlin rethought its "aggressive posture" in Georgia, a close U.S. ally. "This is going to be a defining crisis in the United States-Russian relationship. The danger is that neither side feels it can back down," said Michael Cox, professor of international relations at the London School of Economics. "We may only be at the beginning of this crisis rather than at the end of it." Reuters Comprehensive Coverage

• Russia: Georgia can 'forget' regaining provinces

Russia's big Caucasus win In less than a week of military operations sparked by Georgia's assault on its breakaway province of South Ossetia, Moscow is emerging as the immediate winner. A still-stunned West is looking for ways to censure Russia for its "disproportionate" incursion into Georgia that has reshaped the strategic game in the Caucasus and beyond to Russia's great advantage. "If the Russians stop hostilities now, they will have redrawn the whole strategic situation in the Caucasus, to the detriment of the Americans," says Francois Heisbourg, special adviser to the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris. "No one will invest in Georgia, in oil pipelines, in new ventures [there] now.... The game is over. In the new version of the Great Game, the Russians can cash in." The scope of the "victory" is substantial: Moscow controls territory and leverage, has incapacitated the Georgian military, denied Tblisi its much-hoped-for NATO status, and put the Georgian leader it despises – Mikheil Saakashvili – into a tough position. It has issued a symbolic warning to Ukraine's westward leanings, asserted clout in oil and gas pipeline futures, denied Georgia the possibility of reclaiming breakaway provinces Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and affirmed a deeply Russian set of hard-line political values regarding the disputed front lines of the old cold war. Moreover, by agreeing to halt its military on Tuesday, working with French mediator Nicolas Sarkozy, and only "recommending" that Mr. Saakashvili step down, Moscow is arguing it has reasonably protected its interests and not overthrown a sovereign state. Moscow also appears to be slam-dunking the cease-fire details. The truce, which Saakashvili blamed Russia for breaking Wednesday, contains a "nonuse of force" clause that forbids Georgia to take action inside South Ossetia, a terrific concession. Nor are international peacekeepers coming soon; Russia gained an "additional security role" that formalizes its peacekeeping role in South Ossetia despite US calls for a more independent force in the region. Russia is pushing for international talks on Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which could lead to eventual backing of referendums that would allow those republics to formally separate from Georgia.

• Timeline: Troubled Neighbors

Evidence in Georgia Belies Russia's Claims of 'Genocide' Russia's claims that thousands of civilians were killed during a "genocide" in South Ossetia don't appear to be backed up with evidence. Russia's assertions that it was provoked into war by "genocide" in South Ossetia and that it is observing a cease-fire in Georgia came under new challenge Thursday, as the U.S. stepped up diplomatic pressure on Moscow. Washington agreed to base missile interceptors on Polish soil, in a new sign of how Russia's invasion of Georgia is redrawing the geopolitical map. On the ground in South Ossetia -- the contested region where fighting broke out last week between Georgia and Russia -- there was little evidence that Georgian attacks killed thousands of civilians, as Russia has said. Doctors said they had treated a few hundred people and one cited a confirmed death toll in the dozens. Russia and Georgia agreed to a cease-fire Tuesday, and Russia has said it is keeping the peace in places such as Gori, the Georgian city where Russian tanks have taken up positions. That was belied by an incident inside Gori Thursday morning: A man seized the sport-utility vehicle of three United Nations officials at gunpoint, in full view of Russian troops who did nothing. "Georgian cities remain...subject to hostile and aggressive behavior," said Georgia's ambassador to the U.N., Irakli Alasania. "Looting...and murder have become customary." Russia's U.N. ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, said his nation is a victim of a "disinformation campaign of spectacular proportions." He said Russian troops "have never occupied Gori."

Russia: Poland risks attack because of US missiles A top Russian general said Friday that Poland's agreement to accept a U.S. missile interceptor base exposes the ex-communist nation to attack, possibly by nuclear weapons, the Interfax news agency reported.The statement by Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn is the strongest threat that Russia has issued against the plans to put missile defense elements in former Soviet satellite nations. Poland and the United States on Thursday signed a deal for Poland to accept a missile interceptor base as part of a system the United States says is aimed at blocking attacks by rogue nations. Moscow, however, feels it is aimed at Russia's missile force. "Poland, by deploying (the system) is exposing itself to a strike — 100 percent," Nogovitsyn, the deputy chief of staff, was quoted as saying. He added, in clear reference to the agreement, that Russia's military doctrine sanctions the use of nuclear weapons "against the allies of countries having nuclear weapons if they in some way help them." Nogovitsyn that would include elements of strategic deterrence systems, he said, according to Interfax. At a news conference earlier Friday, Nogovitsyn had reiterated Russia's frequently stated warning that placing missile-defense elements in Poland and the Czech Republic would bring an unspecified military response. But his subsequent reported statement substantially stepped up a war of words.

Military and Strategic Assessments

RUSSIA GOES ROGUE . . . AND AMERICA WIMPS OUT Let's be clear: For all that US commentators and diplomats are still chattering about Russia's "response" to Georgia's actions, the Kremlin spent months planning and preparing this operation. Any soldier above the grade of private can tell you that there's absolutely no way Moscow could've launched this huge ground, air and sea offensive in an instantaneous "response" to alleged Georgian actions. As I pointed out Saturday, even to get one armored brigade over the Caucasus Mountains required extensive preparations. Since then, Russia has sent in the equivalent of almost two divisions - not only in South Ossetia, the scene of the original fighting, but also in separatist Abkhazia on the Black Sea coast. The Russians also managed to arrange the instant appearance of a squadron of warships to blockade Georgia. And they launched hundreds of air strikes against preplanned targets. Every one of these things required careful preparations. In the words of one US officer, "Just to line up the airlift sorties would've taken weeks."

• Fight in Georgia Exposed Weak Points in Kremlin's Aging Army The Kremlin's campaign in Georgia shows that Russia's military has improved from its dilapidated state in the 1990s, but analysts said the aging equipment and tactics also underscored how much more work Moscow faces in its quest to turn its army into a world-class fighting force.

Raids Suggest Russia Targeted Energy Pipelines  A neat row of large craters in a field in southern Georgia strongly suggests that Russia dropped bombs near oil and gas pipelines bringing fuel to the West. Georgian officials say Russian warplanes dropped bombs in an early Saturday raid close to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which pumps some 850,000 barrels of crude a day -- or 1% of total global oil demand -- from Azerbaijan to the Mediterranean. The bombs narrowly missed the line, but one exploded just 10 feet away from it. If the Georgian claims are correct, it isn't clear whether Russia intended to score a direct hit or merely give the West a scare about the security of its energy supply. Zurab Janjgava, general director of Georgian Oil & Gas Corp., said he believes Russia wanted to blow up the pipeline. "These were pinpointed attacks," he said in an interview. Russia has categorically denied attempting to bomb pipelines on Georgian soil. Georgian officials were unable to furnish definitive proof the craters were caused by Russian bombs.But the physical evidence of a recent air attack, witnessed by a reporter, is compelling. The line of craters left by the alleged Russian attacks runs through the middle of a hilly, mostly uninhabited plain some 15 miles south of Tbilisi, near the town of Rustavi. The area lacks military or even human targets. The only sign of civilization is a small farm surrounded by haystacks and grazing herds of cows and sheep. The 45 craters -- each some 60 feet across -- scar the hillside like footprints left by a giant. Close by lies the BTC pipeline, operated by British oil company BP PLC and buried at a depth of nearly six feet. It is identified only by small markers spaced out at one-kilometer (0.62-mile) intervals along the pipeline's route. Mr. Janjgava said another raid Tuesday appeared to have been aimed at a second pipeline, known as Baku-Supsa, which brings Azerbaijan oil from the Caspian Sea to a terminal in Georgia's Black Sea town of Supsa. The craters are concentrated in an area close to where BTC and the Baku-Supsa line intersect, near BTC's 15-mile marker. There were no other reported Russian attacks for many miles around. The raids suggest Russia wasn't only aiming to humiliate its neighbor militarily but also to damage its reputation as an energy corridor.

The Russo-Georgia War's Dire Diplomatic Aftermath To no one's surprise, the  Russians drove back a Georgian attempt to regain control of South Ossetia. There were several hundred military and civilian casualties. The fighting apparently began when some South Ossetia militiamen fired across the border at Georgian troops. This escalated to a Georgian invasion, and a Russian reinforcement of its peacekeepers, and the expulsion of the Georgian troops. All in the space of a week. Since the early 1990s, Russia and Georgia have argued over who should control South Ossetia, a Georgian province on the Russian border. Just to the north of South Ossetia, is the Russian territory of North Ossetia. The Soviets often split ethnic groups between two provinces (or "Autonomous Republics") to make it more difficult for the people to unite in opposition to the Soviet Union. This, among many similar measures, worked. Since the Russians moved in their peacekeepers in the early 1990s, they have issued Russian passports to the South Ossetians and, in effect, annexed the region. So Russia offered its services as mediator and peacekeeper in the early 1990s, and peace was restored. The UN agreed all this, and a reluctant Georgia went along. But after that, the Russians refused to leave, or encourage the Abkhazians and Ossetians to work out a deal to become part of Georgia once more. Abkhazians and Ossetians wanted to be independent, and declared themselves so. No one else recognized this. In 2004, Georgia began cracking down on the smuggling and other criminal activity that was keeping the economy in South Ossetia going. This led to more and more gunfire along the border between Georgia and South Ossetia. Two years ago, Georgia began a major expansion of its armed forces. Russian politicians have been playing the nationalism card, catering to widespread feelings that the Soviet Union should be restored. Most Russians never cared for the communist dictatorship, but they did like being a superpower.  The Russians also feel that those fourteen nations that split off when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, left Russia surrounded by a lot of unstable and vulnerable nations. This sounds paternalistic and paranoid to Westerners, but not to Russians. And the Russians are willing to use force to back up these attitudes, as the Georgians just discovered. Russia still has nukes, and some Cold War attitudes that make for a potentially very dangerous situation.

Geo-Political Consequences

The Russo-Georgia War's Dire Diplomatic Aftermath Nonetheless, a complex and dire diplomatic and political aftermath is upon us. The aggressive, ultra-nationalist Russia has clearly emerged. James Dunnigan of StrategyPage.com argues a military-minded Russia never really went away, it just submerged in post-Cold War poverty. Dunnigan employs a quip, "The empire struggles back" (think Star Wars' "The Empire Strikes Back"), to describe Russian policy in its "near abroad" border regions over the last 15 years. With oil prices high, Russia can spend money on warfare. The Russo-Georgia War classifies as a limited strike sending the message that Russia intends to frustrate --at least in the short term -- the post-Cold War expansion of Western Europe. Poland and Romania are in NATO, in part because they both fear an expansionist Russia, but Russian nationalists see the "West rolling East" into their sphere of influence. Securing Russia's borders and protecting the interests of ethnic Russians are traditional Russian concerns. Ethnic Russian communities in Georgia and Moldova's separatist statelet, Transdniestr, are Kremlin causes celebre. Now these concerns and the wounded ethno-nationalist pride that undergirds them may seem benighted and backward to international elites who proclaim global citizenship and advocate a diplomacy based on motivational oratory, but they energize a substantial number of people in a still quite powerful nation-state. International leaders must deal with the attitude and its militant expression. The nation of Georgia definitely must. In the Kremlin's view, military control of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and part of Georgia proper are post-conflict diplomatic bargaining chips. Russia has other chips. To influence European political, economic or military action, Russia has three convincing tools: nuclear weapons; a veto in the U.N. Security Council; and abundant natural gas shipped to Europe via pipelines. Moscow may invoke its interpretation of The Kosovo Precedent. Here's a thumbnail sketch: After Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence, separatism resulting from international action to protect an ethnic minority has an imprimatur. If protecting Kosovar Albanians elicits a NATO invasion, and in the case of South Ossetia, Russian peacekeepers operating under international aegis were already on the ground and involved in the conflict, what is the gripe? Here's the gripe: Georgia isn't Slobodan Milosevic's thuggish Serbia; it is a democratic state "working its way West" politically and economically. Democracies are qualitatively different from dictatorships. But then Russians roll their eyes and point to Kosovar Serbs in northern Kosovo "unilaterally coerced" into a state -- independent Kosovo. Russia claims "the Kosovo precedent" affects 200 regions or territories in nations around the world. Moscow's insists that Kosovo established a "separatist precedent" for spinning statelets from sovereign nations. South Ossetia may prove to be "the Moscow interpretation" of Kosovo on terms favorable to Russia, invoked where Russian military power can enforce it and diplomatic maneuvering support it.

Welcome Back to the Great Game  Moscow's thin pretense of protecting an ethnic group provided just enough cover for Georgia's timorous friends in the West to ignore increasing Russian provocations over the past few years. Moscow, it now seems, intends to "protect" large numbers of Georgians too -- by occupying and killing them if that's what it takes -- and prevent them from building their own history and pursuing their democratic destiny, as it has for almost two centuries. As we worry about another Russian imperialist adventure in Georgia, we shouldn't lose sight of the bigger picture either: To wit, Moscow has always had a clear strategic use for the Caucasus, one that concerns the U.S. today more than ever. Having overestimated the power of the Soviet Union in its last years, we have consistently underestimated the ambitions of Russia since. Already, a great deal has been said about the implications of Russia's invasion for Ukraine, the Baltic States and Europe generally. But few have noticed the direct strategic threat of Moscow's action to U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Kremlin is not about to reignite the Cold War for the love of a few thousand Ossetians or even for its animosity toward five million Georgians. This is calculated strategic maneuvering. And make no mistake, it's about countering U.S. power at its furthest stretch with Moscow's power very close to home. Besides their own pipeline, Georgia and Azerbaijan offer a fragile strategic conduit between the West and the "stans" of Central Asia -- including Afghanistan -- an area that the Soviets once controlled in toto. We should remember that an isolated Central Asia means an isolated Afghanistan. Look at the countries surrounding Afghanistan -- all former Soviet colonies, then Iran, then Pakistan. The natural resources of Central Asia, from Turkmenistan's natural gas to Kazakhstan's abundant oil, cannot reach the West free of Russia and Iran except through that narrow conduit in the Caucasus. In Iraq too, the Kremlin's projection of power down through Georgia will soon be felt. Take another look at the map. If Russia is allowed to extend its reach southwards, as in Soviet times, down the Caucasus to Iran's borders, Moscow can support Iran in any showdown with the West. Iran, thus emboldened, will likely attempt to reassert itself in Iraq, Syria and, via Hezbollah, in Lebanon.

Vladimir Putin's mastery checkmates the West Russia has been biding its time, but its victory in Georgia has been brutal - and brilliant. The cartoon images have shown Russia as an angry bear, stretching out a claw to maul Georgia. Russia is certainly angry, and, like a beast provoked, has bared its teeth. But it is the wrong stereotype. What the world has seen last week is a brilliant and brutal display of Russia's national game, chess. And Moscow has just declared checkmate. Chess is a slow game. One has to be ready to ignore provocations, lose a few pawns and turn the hubris of others into their own entrapment. For years there has been rising resentment within Russia. Some of this is inevitable: the loss of empire, a burning sense of grievance and the fear that in the 1990s, amid domestic chaos and economic collapse, Russia's views no longer mattered. A generalised resentment, similar to the sour undercurrents of Weimar Germany, began to focus on specific issues: the nonchalance of the Clinton Administration about Russian sensitivities, especially over the Balkans and in opening Nato's door to former Warsaw Pact members; the neo-conservative agenda of the early Bush years that saw no role for Russia in its global agenda; and Washington's ingratitude after 9/11 for vital Kremlin support over terrorism, Afghanistan and intelligence on extremism. More infuriating was Western encouragement of “freedom” in the former Soviet satellite states that gave carte blanche to forces long hostile to Russia. In the Baltic states, Soviet occupation could be portrayed as worse than the Nazis. EU commissioners from new member states could target Russian policies. Populists in Eastern Europe could ride to power on anti-Russian rhetoric emboldened by Western applause for their fluency in English. Nowhere was such taunting more wounding than in Ukraine and Georgia, two countries long part of the Russian Empire, whose history, religion and culture were so intertwined with Russia's. Moscow tried, disastrously, to check Western, and particularly American, influence in Ukraine. The clumsy meddling led to the Orange Revolution. Georgia was a different matter. Relations were always mercurial, but Eduard Shevardnadze, the wily former Soviet Foreign Minister, knew how to keep atavistic animosities in check. Not so his brash successor, Mikheil Saakashvili. From then on, hubris was Tbilisi's undoing. It was not simply the dismissive rhetoric, the open door to US advisers or the economic illiteracy in forgetting dependence on Russian energy and remittance from across the border; it was the determined attempt to make Georgia a US regional ally and outpost of US influence. Big powers do not like other big powers poaching. This may not be moral or fair but it is reality, and one that underpins the Security Council veto.