With the Fall socionomic crisii plus the election and (can it only be a "month") the jumpstart of the
Administration we've sadly neglected Foreign Policy; aside from the "detour" to address Gaza and the ME it's been since August. But because we've not talked about it doesn't mean either that a lot isn't going on nor that a lot isn't being done. Our intent here is to refresh, update and frame all that and provide a benchmark against which we can measure the FP situation going forward. The accompanying graphic is from a Davos09 session detailing the kind, nature and magnitude of the major risks facing the World Community. The readings survey the vital role of the US, the general world situation, the growing depth, breadth and sophistication of the US institutional response (which in all fairness despite rhetorics and mis-interpretations is more building on Bush Administration initiatives and is also a continuation of policy and strategies !). In the readings you'll find the URL (as always click to visit on the blue-shaded titles) to this and at the end a careful selection of other key Davos sessions (along with some valuable Kennedy School and TED talks). But if you listen to nothing else listen to George Friedman's survey of the structural nature of things and the world outlook (The Next Hundred Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century), along with Hans Rosling's TED talk (Rosling's TED profile with two great talks) which'll greatly surprise you IOHO !
Let's summarize things a bit to sketch out what we're going to talk about:
1. The "end of history" is flat wrong - instead we're re-discovering history and all the old political power games, need for international institutions and requirements for national security, defense, a robust and clever foreign policy and, most especially, the need for the US to be constructively engaged in re-factoring the post-WW2 institutional framework and adopting new forms to enable adaptation to new realities, or old ones re-discovered.
2. The single most urgent FP crisis is the metastasizing worldwide economic crisis which could threaten the stability of many different countries and regions; which also means that the Administration's focus on economic policy is in fact the sine qua non of re-stabilizing the world. Despite all the arm-waving in fact the US is more than ever the in-dispensable country, both economically and politically.
3. That means we need to be constructive in our engagement which means pursuing our national interests as the pre-dominant stakeholder while also recognizing other's critical interests and emphasizing getting as many as possible to also act as responsible stake-holders in the state of the world.
4. A critical component, however it works out in details, is focusing on encouraging good but appropriate governance suited to the level of development and cultural history of these potential stakeholders.
5. Finally we need to get back on balance ourselves. So with that as a set of assertions, which we think are provable, let's dive right in. Bear with us a bit here as we're going to cover some ground at a mostly conceptual level and lay down some machinery which we'll be re-using in the future in deeper dives on particular topics.
Re-stabilizing the World
Let's start by taking a look at this little jewel of conceptual over-compression expressed in graphics. One of the things that most folks are in denial about is the fact that violence, or being more sensitive, the control and management of force, governs the nature of how things are run. Just ask any German Baron with a castle on the Rhein. It's always greatly amused us that the US Navy dominates the world's oceans more completely than the Romans controlled the Med and as a result the sea lanes are safe for everyone's commerce. Without it and it's hidden support the world's economy couldn't function yet no critic of so-called American Hegemony objects. Stop and think about it for a while. And has been true for a long-time whether or not the US acts to support the world system or goes ostrich has enormous impacts on everybody else's ability to do their business. The converse is also true - as we should know beyond a shadow of a doubt after 911 ! In an international system control of force is a negotiated balanced among those with the capability, one reason among many that nations will continue to dominate international relations. If we compare and contrast US policy to some representative average of the world's other players we end up with this graphic. Let's say the US can be isolationist and self-centerred, strictly pursuing it's own agenda, call that a Chauvinist. Or it could say the devil with the rest of you all, we're going to pursue our own narrow interests, call that an Evangelist. Or it could act to actively promote worldwide institutions and a stable world order, rather as it has done to a large extent for the last century.(WRFest 27Jan08: What World Do You Want to Live In ?) We think the case is pretty clear-cut that our prosperity and security is better served by pro-active and constructive support of the world system. Contrawise the Rest of the World (RoW) would choose to Tolerate and respect the rights of other nations, go along to get along and Muddle Thru or pursue their own aggressively chauvinistic policies. WW2 was caused by the Axis powers pursuing an aggressively self-centered set of policies while the RoW just let them. The result was a major implosion. The graphic shows this as a dynamic flow of currents over time; wherever you start each set of policies will tend to create force vectors which will move the trends one way or another. Prior to Iraq the US leaned isolationist though it was THE major under-pinner of the system as it existed while the other major powers tend to want to pretend that everything was alright and let it drift. So, for example, Iraq had pursued a corrupt and corrupting Oil for Food program and threatened the stability of the world sytem. The Europeans denied all that and we were eventually headed for a major problem. Not getting int'l support the US chose to act unilaterally. Oddly enough our difficulties in Iraq caused more foreign powers to become more interested in being contributors rather than free-loaders and the current crisis has taken that up a bunch of notches. That timepath is mapped out by the Blue Line which, at this current point in time, presents us with future strategic alternatives of joint collaboration as responsible stakeholders (Green), a gradual degradation driven by un-balanced policies (Yellow) or a true implosive devolution (Red) based on "suave qui peut", or save yourselfs. The catch is that nobody, including the US, can just save themselves. In some ways the Davos speeches and Brown's recent Congressional speech suggests the meta-crisii have presented us with the best opportunity to re-formulate the world system in generations.
Responsible Stakeholders & Good vs Bad Governance
The ability of any government to both maintain it's own stability, manage the socionomic crisis and be a contributory stakeholder rests on the soundness and stability of their governance institutions. (Peace, Stability and Prosperity: the Nature of Good Government) That is can they hold things together, provide the institutional framework for their societies and economies, maintain their legitimacy (their citizens trust them and are committed to supporting them) and balanced inclusisveness. That last is particularly important - the purpose of government is to make societies work better and a critical factor is the extent to which the interests of the citizenry and polity are reflected in decision-making. There's been a slew of books in the last two years or so highlighting the fundamental changes in the world and arguing that China, India, Brazil, et.al. will dominate the next century eventually. State capabilities are ultimately based on two factors: the totality of resources available to them and the efficacy and efficiency with which those resources are deployed. Have you ever wondered how tiny Holland fought and eventually won a century long war against the mightiest power on earth - the Spanish Empire ? While the latter drove itself to bankruptcy multiple times and so encumbered the institutions of Spain with rigid, non-adapative and non-progressive characteristics that Spain to this day hasn't even begun to recover ? The secret lay in Holland's modern, progressive economy, it's manufacturing and trading capabilities, capital markets and representative government. On a 1-10 scale of effective use of available resources the Dutch were probably an 8 while the Spanish were arguably a 3 at best. The French created and experiened similar problems until the repeated bankruptcies and corruptions of the Royal regime led to the Revolution and two centuries of French political instability and dysfunction. Friedman alludes to all this but at the end of the day the ability of the emerging powers to continue their startling progress rests firmly on their ability to re-vamp their institutional foundation. Europe for example has never been able to marshall the continent wide governance to make it's potential power effective. Among other things the accompanying graphic is trying to tell us is that government must be appropriate - don't try to leap to full-blown democracy until the social institutions will support it for example. Russia underwent a big bang that led to the Oligarchs taking power and exploiting the "state" for their own purposes. Putin's rise was essentially the restoration of the Civil Authority. Unfortunately we seem to be seeing the resurrection of traditional Russian power politics, a rigidification and corruption of the system and a likely collapse. Ditto for Europe with a lower probability. What's required for domestic strength AND international contribution is a government that's appropriate AND at least on the frontier that balances extractions of resources with re-investment in socionomic development. The US clearly has a very strong framework as does the UK. It's not clear about Japan, India is fragmented, China is doing alright and Brazil doing quite well, all things considered.
Putting the House in Order: Getting Back on Balance
The guiding principles for US foreign policy are two. First, encourage and support the best achievable governance frameworks around the world. And second, get our own house in better order. We've argued that, aside from the consequences of the socionomic implosion, the most critical (as in urgent and important) foreign policy challenge we face is pro-active engagement and support for the Middle East. (Gaza and the ME: Flames for the Fuses) Every situation is unique and policy, strategy and means have to be adopted that are appropriate for the circumstances. Nonetheless we'd like to suggest that our outline of a sustained US strategy that moves beyond simply keeping the lid on is in our own best interests. And that the strategies sketched in that post are a) models of how we should approach the RofW; for example Latin America and particularly Mexico. And b) an example of the kind of detailed thinking that needs to go on with regard to all our foreign relationships for both geographies and countries as well as the problems inventoried by the Davos group.
At the same time we need to get our own house back in order. The accompanying graphic is from our last post and creates a simple model of post-WW2 US history that argues that we've cycled around civic-minded effort and self-minded indulgence. In that model after the recovery efforts, so-to-speak, of the '80s we went over-board in the '90s and paid the price this decade. And will continue paying it for some time. Since all the troubles we've been wrestling with from the War on Terror (now the Long War) to the changes in the world system to the crisis are all metastasizing we effectively got blindsided. To meet these challenges requires a return to core values, concerted efforts and the design, development and implementation of new institutions and capabilities. Again much that the Bush Administration did behind the scenes was trying to adapt to the new emergencies without having adequate capabilities on hand. Enormous strides have been made in many areas, for example Intelligence. (There's no better example of perspective and insight than this Kennedy School talk:Today's Challenges, Tomorrow's Threats: Why America Needs an Agile and Robust Intelligence Community . Nor no better example of the organosclerotic barriers to adaptation than the post we built around another one:Changes and Challenges: a New Year Unlike Most Others).
Meeting the Enemy 
Now, to get our own house in order, we need to make and implement the same kind of policy initiatives and strategic capability development in a whole host of other areas (). Which brings us full-circle back to the importance of domestic economic policy, investment in the future and the development of new institutions and policies in Regulation, Education, Healthcare and Education ! (Miracles on Pennsylvannia Ave: Make it So, No. 1 !, The Devil's Advocates: Dancing Dimagogues vs Economic Policy (Update),To Boldly Go Where We Must: Speech, Budget and Dr. Noes). Unfortunately too many seem to be interested in manuvering for partisan political advantage rather than acting for the general public good. We need a loyal opposition but it must needs be a constructive opposition. As that great philosopher and statesman Pogo told us so long ago we have met the enemy and he's us.
Continue reading "Foreign Policy for a Dangerous Old World: Adoption, Adaptation & Resilience" »