Parts to Wholes: the Socionomic Systems Nexus

Since the candidates aren't being as clearly forthcoming with their policy directions as we'd like the  next step is to return to foundations and parse out the details, to some extent, ourselves. And since Barry is just finishing up his triumphal tour of foreign shores the area of Foreign Affairs and National Security seems like the appropriate place to start. After the break are a set of collected excerpts that review the national security situation, the broader topic of US grand strategy with respect to the world and Iraq specifically. Unfortunately for us all his posture on Iraq seems to be accurately captured in the cartoon - which despite being a couple of weeks old represents the feedback we've been getting on several fronts. Despite what you heard on the news both the Iraqi government and the commanders on the ground told them the last thing they wanted was a definite timetable. While supportive of an eventual withdrawal, or at least drawdown, what they're after is a flexibility to decide in concert with the evolution of events. Along with a longer term US commitment to Iraqi security, defense and on-going support. What Col. Austin Bey characterizes as strategic over-watch.

In fact the Surge strategy has been enormously successful and laid the basic foundations for a more durable civil environment. At the same time the defeat of al-Queda in Iraq (AQI) has had three fundamental consequences. First it's functioned as an enormous rat trap with every nutjob inthe region and further being drawn into the meatgrinder and suffering enormous casualties. Second the unchecked violence deployed by AIQ has resulted in a major defeat for them in the public mind thruout the ME. And third, though only a far-away glimmer, it raises the potential for a stable, improving and democratic country sitting in the middle of the world's most unstable, dangerous and strategic geography. Which btw means Barry's emphasis on Afghanistan as the "central front" is an error of judgment of monumental proportions, as pointed out by no less than the Washington Post on its' editorial page. His posturing and manipulation of the press coverage - preventing all active coverage and interviews and presenting somewhat distorted views of what he was getting as feedback, can at best be described as disingenuous and self-serving. As Lord Keynes put it, "when the facts change I change my mind. What do you do, sir ?"

Which is not to say that Iraq was, by any means well-executed. But we did succeed in adopting and adapting in "orderly, proficient, military manner" to quote GSY T. Highway. Which leads to broader questions of what did we learn and how do we apply those lessons worldwide for a more open and inclusive US Foreign Policy. Earlier we'd argued (Brave New World: Non-Flatness, History and Challenges, Peace, Stability and Prosperity: the Nature of Good Government) that the central principle of US FP ought to be constructive engagement with the world to establish a new world system based on a stable int'l regime that asked for support from major stakeholders in line with the benefits they receive. And one that also recognizes that failed states are in no one's interest.

With those governing principles in mind the lesson for strategic development of our FP capabilities include a more balanced emphasis on bringing to bear all our capabilities in an integrated whole, which is NOT well-received among the bureaucratic turf-mice. It also includes using those TBD capacities in our specific strategies, the example given here being Pakistan. And finally it means putting more emphasis on soft power and public diplomacy. An integrated perspective we've tried to represent in the accompanying graphic.

Yet at the end of the day this requires vision, leadership, integrity and honesty as opposed to pursuit of narrow and partisan political advantage. Take a look at the readings below - where we've deliberately and typically passed on the more polemical and biased sources in favor of the informed and balanced. After you skim them - or better, clicked thru and read a few - make up your own minds regarding whether Barry was a) being disingenuous, b) right, c) flexible and d) public-spirited. On the whole my interpretation of these reports does not lead to a favorable conclusion. 

The Democrats fought the surge with every maneuver and ounce of energy they could muster, including pejorative attacks on our commanders and distortions. Notice that they've been notably silent since around Oct. Given their position that we'd screwed up it would seem to me civic responsibility called for fixing the problem...not trying to make it as much worse as possible.

So how would you like to evaluate things ? The final excerpt on Iraq outlines a strategic alternative that serves all our goals and applies these lessons. And Sen. Obama would achieve a new stature in my mind if he'd carp the diem and adopt some version. Instead he seems to be doing his level best to come out even more mis-guided than when he went in. Very sad for a reasonable, rational man who could have been one of the great leaders of our time.

Continue reading "Foreign Affairs, Security & Iraq: Poseur in Chief ?" »

Posted by dblwyo at 03:32 PM | Permalink | Comments (1)

It's time for another slightly deep dive on Iraq, both for its' own sake and for the value of the lessons learnable. We say learnable because the lessons are there if one wants to pay attention to them. Or one can focus on the popular mythology that's grown up under political pressures and partisan posturing. In actual point of fact something of a miracle has occurred but we'll get to that and our reasons for saying. Let's start with this fascinating appearance on the Rose program of Meghan O'Sullivan who served on the NSC for Iraq and is now at the Kennedy School. She lays out a balanced, informed and "feet-on-the-ground" assessment of where we were and the challenges facing us. Interestingly, and evidence for the learnability conundrum, is that it was a rather low-rated show, despite the balance and honesty on a critically important issue.

Eine Kleine Nachthistorische...a Little Night History 

Just to review the bidding we'll make three points. First, as a counter-factual. Saddam was undoing the sanctions rather rapidly leveraging Oil-for-Food, corrupting politicians around the world and enlisting the support of both France and Russia. He did in fact have a weapons program if no inventory that was re-startable and scalable and he did have extensive contacts with terrorists. And for those who further forget their history we'd had an extensive no-fly near-combat and troops on the ground for a decade and to get his grudging appearances of new cooperation put 140,000 troops on his borders. Unsustainable.

Second we conducted a brief, lightening fast and brilliant blitzkrieg to seize the country, remove Saddam and turn it over to a civilian government. And therein lies the most fundamental problem. But we should also mention that leading up to the war we struggled with the diplomatic air cover which was nowhere near as good as it should be but also not much worse, given the aforementioned corruption, than it could be. We didn't lay out a clear and motivating national objective and instead used the WMD maneuver instead of laying out the true depth and breadth of the challenges. And third we completely mis-judged the nature of the problem, the fundamental problem. There was no government, stable socio-politico class or other source of potential "turnover". Instead Iraq collapsed into a primitive tribal state. No you can wave your arms all you want about those failures - and we have - but it's also fair to say nobody could have estimated the true depth of dysfunction that Saddam had created. Much worse than Stalin in the old Soviet Union. What was needed was an "American Caesar" to go in, assume supreme authority and re-build the institutional infrastructure of the country. Much as we did in Japan or Germany after WW2. Only it took us almost two years to come to that realization.

Third, and there's the ebb-n-flow of the Baathist/alQuada insurgency, the overt and covert subversion of Iraqi stability by Iran and the diabolically clever triggerring of Shia-Sunni conflict by alQ. Clever not brilliant because their intransigence, cruelty and abuse eventually led to their complete rejection by the people. Who in fact do want a better society. As a sidenote btw we'd also mention the notion of a Rat Trap - for everybody who claims we neglected Afghanistan we'll point out that every nutjob  who wanted to be a Jihadi terrorist who might have had to be hunted down in those mountains they all came to Iraq, got themselves killed and, with their indifference to civilian lives, alienated the Arab street across the ME. Net net not bad in the cruel calculus that applies. Nontheless we made two further major mistakes, that built on the vacuum mis-understanding. We approached the tactics and strategy via the lens of conventional warfare and we completely ignored and neglected the real nature of Iraqi culture and the role of tribes.

And Then a Miracle Occurs

The miracle is that we completely re-thought, re-tooled and re-directed our policy, strategy, tactics and training. The military that when into Iraq had learned the lessons of nation-building and counter-insurgency multiple times, most recently on this scale in Nam. As an old military history buff I spent a lot of time reading up on all that but never realized that as soon as they disengaged all those painfully bought lessons were thrown away to return to their roots of heavy armored warfare. Worse yet, as we've learned, the senior leadership of the Army during that era learned and knew the lessons of COIN but was never able to change the institution at the time.

As Jim Stockdale points out in his book, "Philosophical Fighter Pilot" the greatest difficulty, calling for the most profound moral courage and leadership, is not to just admit when you're wrong. It's to stick with the problem and it's metastasized new forms and figure out what to do with the real situation. Not only the Army refused to change. Worse people, especially, like McNamara realized in '67 that they were wrong. And refused to adapt thru an utter failure of moral courage and leadership responsibilities. One should view "Fog of War" as the apologia of a man who sent thousands to their deaths because he failed in his duties. 

Well we've learned, adopted, adapted and changed. We've previously discussed the work of Col. David Kilcullen who was instrumental in this process. For a fair and balanced assessment of the situation his Rose appearance is as good as it gets and perfectly complements O'Sullivan's. But if you read/look at no other thing take a look at his presentation to the COIN think tank of the US Army: Kilcullen’s Presentation on COIN and Iraq (!!!!!).

It doesn't get any better than that in terms of lessons, history, assessment, examples and the role of "kinetics" vs the other 90%. To give you a flavor we've extracted a couple of his charts. Which use Iraq as their case but look back widely at all the history of COIN operations and draw on everybody from Lawrence on down. Kilcullen lays out a complete framework for what it takes to establish peach and security, how old cultures and societies break under the lack, how economic and socio-political initiatives have to function and some specific lessons. Here's the real rub: the framework works to understand, analyze and strategize any effort to build a peaceful and prosperous society. In fact it not only applies to other nation-building challenges, e.g. Africa, but could serve as a useful platform for understanding, suitably adapted, of the challenges facing the leaderships of Russia or China. Or for that matter ourselves as we wrestle with re-building our own inner cities.

This second chart  more specifically lays out the  multiple layers of effort required  from Counter-Terror  to  Count-Insurgency to Peace-keeping Operations to true Nation-building. Fortunately our inner city challenges aren't as dire as the top two layers but sure bear a lot of resemblance to the bottom one. And when people keep urging us to go into Darfur it's not going to be solved with a few "Western" troops. In fact that's as naive, arrogant and wrong a mis-conception as the nay-sayers always claimed Kipling was. If you want to know how well he understood things from Kilcullen's perspective and how little the wishful thinkers get it go read some of his poetry.(Kitchener's School)

As you skim over the readings below please keep all this in mind. The standard popular mythology and MSM reporting has gotten the recent efforts by the Iraqi central government to supress the Sadrists completely wrong. In fac this is one of the single most encouraging things to have happened in Iraq since the beginning. It shows that first off the Sunni west is coming into the fold and beginning to rejoin the government and the society. So that, secondly, supression of the most dangerous Shia power-seekers can now absorb the efforts and resources of a newly confident central authority who was able to use a newly built and hugely more competent national security force. And that Iran, the proximate source of the problem, is now on the table to be dealth with. As Kilcullen points out we've got a long way to go to get a stable, secure, peaceful and prosoperous Iraq. But a lot of the right things are slowly moving into place and we're more on the right path than we've evern been. 

Continue reading "Iraq Resartus (Readings): Stability, Progress and Will" »

Posted by dblwyo at 11:13 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

We've recently put up a collection of posts on the real situation in Iraq from reliable sources which is vastly at variance with MSM coverage, including the political editor for the WSJ of all places ! In the process of trying to pretend this isn't happening we've largely abandoned a couple of really key things. One is the serious national debate we should have on our policy and strategy there, which is not something we can continue to neglect.

The things that's really shameful IMHO is that we've neglected and ignored the troops who are putting it all on the line for us. Whatever your position, and make no mistake this is serious, neglecting the just due for our troops is reprehensible at best. We'll leave you to insert any other words you care. By and large there's such a small minority of the population serving that people can continue to ignore this.

As we re-enter the Age of Kipling, as he really wrote not as a century of critics read him. Sidebar - it's worth your time to go back and read some of his poetry and short-stories. All of his intellectual critics conceded he was a wonderful craftsman but dismissed his content as base and jingoistics. Well when I shared my copy with selections of his collected poetry my nephew, who left the Corps after two tours though none in combat, was lost to me for hours. His only and final comments were that they were so true, where had this stuff been and why didn't people get it. When you talk to the troops they don't ask you to support the war. Or even support them though as the video shows they deeply, at the most profound levels, appreciate it. What they ask you to do is pay attention. If for no other reason that they are dying for our sins.

Tommy

Yes, makin' mock o' uniforms that guard you while you sleep
Is cheaper than them uniforms, an' they're starvation cheap;
An' hustlin' drunken soldiers when they're goin' large a bit
Is five times better business than paradin' in full kit.
    Then it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "Tommy, 'ow's yer soul?"
    But it's "Thin red line of 'eroes" when the drums begin to roll,
    The drums begin to roll, my boys, the drums begin to roll,
    O it's "Thin red line of 'eroes" when the drums begin to roll.

 And if you think we're kidding or exaggerating check out this video as well: Marines in Berzerkley from the Daily Show

Continue reading "Welcome Home: No Iraq Debate Dissess the Troops ?" »

Posted by dblwyo at 10:48 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Well this seems to be a string of Iraq, ME and National Security posts. But then between the Shia uprising in Basra and it's defeat by the Central government, the Petraeus/Crocker Report and other associated ME and Defense concerns it should be. At least there was certainly a wealth of news. After the break is a set of excerpts that start with a review of the surge, the associted political debates and contrasting takes on the Petraeus Report. Perhaps one of the most balanced and interesting however is the recent appearance on Rose of John Burns and Dexter Filkins of the NYT, who collectively have more time in the heat than almost any other reporters or analysts. Normally they're both pretty negative and report on the current facts as they see them but without putting them into a larger analytical or interpretative context. Which makes their comments all the more surprising. So after you skim over the excerpts we suggest you watch the show, and come back.

[PAUSE]

These guys are bright, informed, courageous and good but I recently criticized them for not having seen the events they reported on in a larger context. For example last year when what we see today was being put in place yet they were still reporting negatively without understanding the SEE changes taking place all around them. A friend has called me to task on at least two grounds as being unfair. First off they're reporters not analysts. And second their tendency to report from their own worldviews is common among everybody involved - in fact we made policy on the foundations of appalling ignorance about the culture and the history. What's that line from Shakespeare ? "Caesar forgive him for he is a Briton and thinks the customs and manners of his tribe are laws of the universe".

Continue reading "The Road Less Traveled: Petraeus, Iraq and Futures" »

Posted by dblwyo at 10:15 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Three stores have popped up in the last couple of days that are just startling, at least to me. So it seemed like a good idea for us to take a look at them in light of the MSM neglect of the real situation on the ground in Iraq and what its means for the long-term. We'll presume some background based on these prior posts which might be worth reviewing (WRFest 30Mar08(Iraq): the Emergence of Central Authority, WRFest 6Apr08(National Security): the Surge, Iraq, the Military & Terrorism). In a way the three stories after the break are capstone indicators. And despite all the troubles and tribulations, or is that tribalations, and what's still to come may mean a major turning point. Miliary men talk about a cusp point in operations when the momentum shifts in the strategic direction of a major operation. We reached that point sometime last summer with regard to Sunni abandonment of alQ and adoption of the Iraqi political process. But that's been having repurcussions, positive ones, across the country that speak to the glimmerings of a similar shift on the socio-politico-economic side of things. It ain't a chequered flag just yet but the head timer is getting it out of it's bag, at least for this race (which we need to remember is not a season).

Continue reading "Three More for the Road: Iran, Sistani and the Big Snake" »

Posted by dblwyo at 01:51 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

The other really big foreign policy story going on over the last two+ weeks is the effort by Iraq's central government to bring Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army (thugs, terrorists, sectarians, private army) under control. One of the biggest problems we've all, and all includes both the US and the Iraqis, have faced is the capacities of the central government. Which have sufferred from sectarianism, divided power and authority, corruption but most especially from the penchant of strong men to pursue their own agendas. Again we really don't grasp how truly lucky and blessed we are that our politicians may pursue their own ends they do it within the context of making the system work. Rather than trying to work the system to meet their own ends. In fact there is a general principle hiding in their someplace - whatever the form of governance and government if those in power will act, on balance, for the betterment of the whole then historically it qualifies as good government.

Well Iraq's government ain't great but it's getting better. And the reporting, coverage and analysis of the Sadrist insurrections, who are supported and funded (at least in part) by Iran,has largely missed, ignored or distorted what by is a major step forward. Which should be front-page news. And is not divorced from the last year's successes of the Surge.

Continue reading "WRFest 30Mar08(Iraq): the Emergence of Central Authority" »

Posted by dblwyo at 08:19 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

UPDATE (Jan17): On reviewing this post it dawned on that we just leaped into the topic without, likely, motivating it. Or less politely put - why do you care ? Two reasons and both important for the future and the well-being of your grandchildren. 1) Success in Iraq REQUIRES this adaptation to cultural realities and its' growth and evolution to a broader sense of Unified Action on our part and collaborative nation-building with the Iraqis. And 2) this is a template for challenges we're going to be facing for decades into the future. Consider Pakistan and Afghanistan let alone Latin America, especially the bubbling cauldron of Calderon's war against the druggies which could explode into a socio-political breakdown at any time. In many cases we can't/won't intervene but the concept of understanding how foreign cultures work and what local ground truths are and HOW to WORK with them as they are rather than how we fantasize them will be central to US Foreign Policy. Hopefully that's a sufficient answer for why you care ! ;) 

Now back to our previously scheduled blogpost. 

Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife is, within the community of counter-insurgency operators, a pretty well-known little book. But as it happens outside that charmed community hardly known at all. When you ask what's happened in Iraq this past year there are several keys, which are traced out in the chronological readings below.

Continue reading "Readings(MilDoctrine & Foreign Policy): Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife" »

Posted by dblwyo at 03:05 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Now that we're getting back into the swing of things it seemed like it was time to re-visit Iraq. As part of that we reviewed all the prior '07 collections of stories and links and consolidated them below. It actually turns out to be much longer than anticipated and might have been better split into two major postings. However the number of major stories has dropped so precipitously that that may not be required in the future. We'll see but in the meantime here's a single central place to go. While you may not care to "read" them we'd suggest it's worth a quick skim of the excerpts, at least the titles. What you'll find, we believe, is a rather rapid and deep structural change in what's going on.

If you'll cast you mind back to about this time last year the biggest headlines were about the plans for a "Surge" to support a major new counter-insurgency doctine. Which was bitterly opposed by all right thinking sorts, mainly the Democrats but certainly with the obvious exception of McCain almost silent Republican support. In fact many of them were bailing out. Yet talk about a withdrawl, even a precipitous one, was still a major headline thruout the summer. As you'll be able to see below. It slowly began to be displaced by another meme of "Gen. Petraeus needs time". Actually given an initial surge and doctine change circa Feb/Mar to "neutral" results by mid-summer to a very strong status report in Oct. or so, which was still badly poo-poohed by most of the pundits, including the faculty at the Kennedy School (some of whom had helped shape it !) to now when, lo and behold, it's come off the table. More interestingly it's also come out of the candidates back of major themes to hammer on. Which in a way is really too bad since we should have a serious national debate.

Meanwhile we'll point you at the extensive listing of stories and links below the continuation, the two excerpts below and rather recent Charlie Rose appearance by the Bagdhad bureau chief of the NYT which has a certain tone of "gee, we didn't expect this to work and we can't tell you why it is but it is though there are still problems". Which is about what Petraeus and everybody has been saying for some time.

Continue reading "Readings(Iraq Jul-Dec07): Catastrophe to Success to Not-disussed ?" »

Posted by dblwyo at 07:18 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

The WSJ just released its' latest joint poll with NBC and Iraq is now the top priority of only 18% of the voters and in the top two priorities of 36%. What's really interesting is that in the immediately prior survey those numbers were 26% and 46% respectively. Clearly Iraq is coming off center stage and moving to a back burner. If you haven't noticed the candidates in general have quit beating that drum on either side all of a sudden, including the Dems, who have rapidly retreated from their position of it's a terrible idea, doomed to fail and we should get out as rapidly as possible. Even more interesting his recent appearance on the Charlie Rose show Pres. Bill Clinton spent some time discussing, albeit grudingly, how well things are going. Much more importantly he also ennunciated a clear and balanced strategy of not withdrawing abruptly but instead pulling out as rapidly as possible yet making absolutely sure that we stay long enough and with enough force to make sure something better than chaos comes into existence. Which is my preferred policy option, could be argued to be the strategic goal of the administration (again come to late, with blinders and grudingly but at least realism triumphs). At the end of the day this is a startling about face however rationalized but deeply encouraging (btw the whole show is well worth watching as the outline of key issues, the role of foreign policy and security and the mandate for workable policies are discussed; among several reactions a major one of mine was to wonder where was this statesman in the '90s ?).

Continue reading "Iraq Staii Refresh: the Surge is Working Well, Now What ?" »

Posted by dblwyo at 11:11 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

 While thinking about Iraq, the specific linkages to Iran and Iran's broader challenges as well as the broader situation in the Middle East the result was a preliminary "picture" of how all the pieces sorta inter-relate to one another. Call it a first pass conceptual diagram which tries to depict most of the critical linkages, players/entities and impressionistic magnitude of the problem. But before we get to that there's another rather startling piece of information which is worth your while.

Two very respected military analysts (Michael O'Hanlon of Brookings and Kenneth Pollack ex-intel analyst) published an editorial reporting on their assessments of a recent visit there. While they've been harsh critics of the war, especially the lack of adaptability of our leadership, this recent column is much more upbeat. I strongly urge you to read it for yourselfs (click on the URL) but here's an excerpt:

A War We Just Might Win VIEWED from Iraq, where we just spent eight days meeting with American and Iraqi military and civilian personnel, the political debate in Washington is surreal. The Bush administration has over four years lost essentially all credibility. Yet now the administration’s critics, in part as a result, seem unaware of the significant changes taking place. Here is the most important thing Americans need to understand: We are finally getting somewhere in Iraq, at least in military terms. 

This picture and its' interpretation will keep getting worked on but let's take a first pass. To start with the major entities are shown sized with respect to their influence on the current situation and strategic outlook for Iraq - not evaluated against their own problems or other strategic concerns, e.g. the chances of Pakistani collapse and the release of nuclear weapons to terrorists. As I've been saying based on StrategyPage and O'Hanlon and Pollack confirm there's a great deal of complexity in the Iraqi situation but progress is being made on many fronts, though political dysfunction and corruption continue to be major challenges. Iran has a similarly complicated - or much more so - set of internal issues which the Economist just surveyed ( Bombs Away  - free).  Iran is a huge challenge and  reading this piece  will help but the key two problems are the split government and a declining (actually, failing) economy. Which are not seperte events. The theocrats actually control the gov't and are pusuring their own ideological/religious foreign policy designed to restore and enhance the spirt of the Revolution. As a result they are supporting Hamas, Hezzbollah, the Taliban, Shia militias in Iraq AND alQ/Sunni terrorists with arms, training, and money as well  as intelligence and people.It's fair to say that continued Iranian support for these folks is probably as big a problem as we face in Iraq and does not serve the interests of  Iraquis or Iranians, just the theocrats.

We'll build on the other components later but see what you think so far. 

Posted by dblwyo at 06:12 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

George Forman of  StratFor (often  called the private person's  CIA)  lays out a  comprehensive ,  astute and insightful  assessment of  the  Iraq  situation, Iran's  strategic  policies and actions the likely impacts on  the success of US  policy  and strategy.  Well  worth your time. While it dates from Jan07  it still provides a  well-grounded baseline for  evaluating the current talks underway between the US and Iraq.

BtW - while you're reading this, or before even, may I suggest reviewing the strategic chessboard of consequences laid out in an earlier post: Big Question #1: What Happens if We Leave. If you'll pardon me, perhaps strongly recommend. So far none of the recent commentators, e.g. on Charlie Rose, have ticked thru the entire list laid out hear. That's the bad news. The good news is that the first few questions are NOW on the table for more public discussion.

Continue reading "Rhetoric and Reality: The View from Iran" »

Posted by dblwyo at 07:15 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

It’s probably about time and then some to update and reflect on what’s been going on in Iraq, from the last posts that laid out the approach and status. The biggest problems seem to be that there are three clocks running on separate timescales: US/Iraq Security Forces, Iraqi domestic government and US domestic politics. In particular while the Iraqis continue to make progress on putting together the right institutional foundations a lot of internal squabbling and back-stabbing politics is making progress difficult. Also, corruption continues to be a major…major problem. But let’s start by updating our little evaluation matrix, provide a brief summary of some recent interesting materials and point you to some stuff you ought to check out for yourselves.

Continue reading "Big Question #3(a): What's Been Happening in Iraq" »

Posted by dblwyo at 05:36 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

This is the third in a series of five Big Questions about the Iraq situation and its’ viability – that is what are our chances for pulling it off without a catastrophe that will haunt us. Actually in an earlier post listing the questions it was phrased a bit differently:  Who are the relevant parties in Iraq, what are their interests and what are they likely to do ?  The prior post started to answer the first two parts so we can dig deeper into the last one. Re-phrasing it as, “what needs to happen and who’s doing what to whom ?”.

Continue reading "Big Question #3: What Needs to Happen in Iraq ?" »

Posted by dblwyo at 11:35 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

After commenting on Sen. Lierberman's editorial I e-mailed his office and got a form letter reply. While a stand response it struck me as one of the more balanced and comprehensive approaches to strategy on Iraq and I'm re-publishing it here.

Continue reading "Lieberman Responds: Sorta" »

Posted by dblwyo at 03:28 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-CT) has an interesting editorial in today's Wall St. Journal, or the free OpinionJournal on how bitter partisan divides in Congress are putting our own sectarian conflicts ahead of good policy. Instead he suggests - as I read it - at least two things. First with more troops, a new commander, an evolved strategy and - something he doesn't mention but is implicit - more support from the Iraqi government plus Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani on suppressing Shia sectarian violence and establishing a sustainable security presence in Baghdad - there is an improved chance for recovering a window of opportunity.

Continue reading "Sen. Lieberman on Consequences" »

Posted by dblwyo at 07:15 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

In two previous entries I listed the major questions that do not seem to be a part of the debate over Iraq policy and then dove down into the first one: what happens if we leave. In this entry I’d like to look at what happens if we stay – that is, how can we achieve our strategic goals ? Which the last post identified as a viable, secure and prosperous Iraq that provides a better environment for it’s own citizens and stability and access to oil in the Middle East.

None of these are easy questions though you can find them discussed here and there. But any debate about the subject should – and to the best of my knowledge no pundit, talking head, columnist, politician nor official has said much, if anything, in a broad public forum. So with those limitations in mind I’d like to offer a series of considerations that might get us started, and are subject to extension and revision as more is brought forth.

The basic goals include Security and Stability of the country, establishment of effective governance and administration, including dealing as best as possible but realistically with the endemic corruption problem and spoils-based sectarianism, getting the economy going again starting with necessary reconstruction, the re-establishment of public services and development of public infrastructure such as schools, college, highways and hospitals.

Continue reading "Big Question #2: What Needs to Be Done If We Stay ?" »

Posted by dblwyo at 02:40 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

In an earlier entry we put up the five big questions that ought to be and aren’t being asked regarding the situation in Iraq. Let me defer questions #2-5 for follow-on and list the serial consequences that would appear to be risks and possibly escalating ones that ensure from a badly handled and/or too rapid US withdrawal.

And preface this short, “pungent” little list by saying that the reason for it is that, to me, all the sound bite political discussions seem to be pretty explicitly assuming that we can walk away and there won’t be any serious consequences. I couldn’t disagree more and think, if anything, this is an even more dangerous situation than when we entered.

But let’s be honest here as well. Likely we all wish the situation had never come up but that’s a historical debate which we can have another day and place and time. Today we’re faced with situation as it is – not as we wish it to be. And continuing with the honesty, and guessing that everyone shares my view on this, I sure wish it were possible to walk away with no consequences. Or that there were a simple, workable, practical answer to our dilemmas. Or even better one that was fast and cheap. Let’s admit that to ourselves and more on.

The fact is that there is no sound-bite simple answer to this one.

All our options are ugly and difficult. And carry enormous risks.

So be it – let’s deal with it and move on.

Continue reading "Big Question #1: What Happens if We Leave" »

Posted by dblwyo at 03:06 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Earlier we tried to ‘set the table’, so-to-speak by carefully outlining the approach to assessing the strategic situation in Iraq. As important as this is to the well-being of America and the world, and out of respect for ourselves, our troops, the Iraqis and the dead and injured, we owe it all of us to be judicious.

The biggest problem I see by all parties is the pursuit of simple minded solutions without examining the trade-offs, implications or consequences that taking many of those solutions as sound policy requires. That is stopping at the first step in a chain of analysis, preferably with an intent that supports your pre-judgments and prejudices and ignores all the issues and trade-off considerations of those choices as you imply. We need to take several more turns of the crank, starting with the few  big, critical questions that are not being addressed. And then taking each of them in turn through several steps of asking, "so what then  ?"

Here's my list of big strategic questions I don't see on the table:

1. If we leave what are the consequences of exiting ? Admitting beforehand that the style, timing and circumstances are important.
2. If we stay what needs to be accomplished to achieve our strategic goals ?
3. Who are the relevant parties in Iraq, what are their interests and what are the likely to do ?
4. What kind of international and regional support/interference is likely and how do we best influence it ?
5. What kind of US domestic politics are likely and what can we do to create the necessary support to make our strategic choices workable ?

There may be more but that seems a long enough and careful enough list to not only get started but to move far ahead of where we are or where we've ever been. Tom Sowell makes that comment that most policy debates are over intent and don't just neglect but completely ignore the actual incentives and constraints of selected policies and the several steps beyond the first necessary to map out the likely consequences. It's certainly characteristic of this situation.

In fact in looking around there doesn’t seem to be a single, simple or straight-forward source one can go to even see these questions being asked let alone being addressed.

The shortness of the list is not a measure of it’s importance.

PRIOR POSTS:

Thinking About Iraq: a Balanced Perspective ? 

Posted by dblwyo at 02:29 PM | Permalink | Comments (1)

With all the back and forth on Iraq it's hard to get the mental distance to think about it clearly and with all the factors weighted, weighed and balanced. And we seem to be more focused on what sounds good in Peoria, or the Upper West Side for that matter, than on where our own best interests might lie. Very hard to sort out. But almost all of the discussions seem to me to ignore the long-term consequences and the risks, irrespective of where you stand on the original decisions.

When we look at major policy issues like this our approach is often an important, indeed critical part of the examination. And especially worth doing if you happen to believe, as I do, that this is one of the most important foreign policy issues that will impact our place in the world for decades. Put that another way - the risks are enormous, the consequences of not considering them could be severe and it’s in our own personal interests to invest a little time in thinking about those issues.

By and large in huge-scale issues of this sort the original and continuing decisions are made based on our (actually politicians and policy-makers) intent for the outcome rather than asking what processes are going to be put in motion. There’s one critical question that should be repeated multiple times:

WHAT HAPPENS THEN ?

That is, what is the next step in our examination, and the next and the next. Thinking beyond stage one – time-consuming, difficult and expensive. But all too often un-intended consequences are not so much unintended as a failure to ask that question.

One can argue that the initial decision likely was taken without such consideration, aside from ‘normal’ military planning and post-conflict civil affairs planning. One can further argue that as the conflict has evolved, major shifts in our opponents strategies and tactics haven’t received the broad examination they deserve. Though we should recognize the superb efforts, spirit and adaptive ingenuities of our military forces. While questioning the broader policy and operational contexts they've struggled to make good on.

But here’s the other major, salient fact: we are where we are and much as I’d like to go back and re-think all these earlier steps the consequences we face will be as the result of the decisions we take now and going forward.

By and large we do not seem to be examining this in terms of consequences if we walk. And careful evaluation of alternatives and the means, mechanisms, incentives and constraints facing ALL the players also seems to be missing.

It also seems fair to say that US sectarian partisanship, that puts domestic political advantage ahead of strategic requirements, will likely sacrifice sound policy for something that sounds good in the headlines. Instead of what might actually work on the ground, in the region and for us in the long-run. Our ability to open up those sorts of questions depends though on not being willing victims of political gamesmanship but instead insisting that our collective leadership take responsibility for seriously addressing the real, under-lying character of the challenge, the alternatives and the mechanisms.

Politicians, and thereby policy makers, tend to focus on short-term, sound-good INTENTIONAL choices because that’s what we best respond to. Let’s try another approach based on looking at the parts, the incentives and constraints and try to extrapolate reaonsable guestimates as to how things might play out. In other words how the system will roll forward given our choices.

Instead of what feels and sounds good might we consider some interesting, scary questions ?  What will follow in a multi-part set of entries is my best attempt to lay out some of those questions and the best answers that can be put together from a wide range of inputs and my own bit of analysis.

Posted by dblwyo at 11:05 AM | Permalink | Comments (1)