Chant after me: Economy, Industry, Firm. Economy, Industry, Firm. Economy, Industry Firm. That's your new mantra. Understand what the real trends in the Economy are, understand how industries are facing those trends and reacting to them - in particular whether or not their fundamental business models and strategies are able to cope with the trends and then understand how individual firms are behaving. Running with the herd or different model. In Hinduism, at least according to Joseph Campbell, the purpose of chanting AUM is to serve as a mind-body mantra capturing the sounds of the Alpha to the Omega with a final silence indicating that one really can't. Well the chant of the Finance Industry has been Vaule at Risk (VaR) - otherwise known as we can model this. The originator of regression model was the Prince of Mathematicians, Karl Friendrich Gauss. He came up with the technique to correct survey sampling data when he was in charge of surveying for a small German principality (good maps were important for armies, tax collectors and commerce you see, so the 2nd greatest mathematician in known history put his mind to it). The catch is that he was trying to minimize data errors for a well known model - the Earth.
VaR presumes that the estimated parameters can be derived from past historical experience and
that the underlying model is known and constant. Both of which presumptions are proving to be very presumptuous. The emerging narrative in the industry is that the sub-prime mess was a Black Swan event - predictable only in hindsight though naturally occurring. Well actually predictable in foresight, and several did though that's now ignored as this new narrative emerges and takes over the standard thinking. And not at all unusual - in fact the same breakdowns that led to LTCC's breakdowns, part of Enron's problems and in fact, going back to Tulip Bulb mania. Fortunately the new narrative is starting to include the idea of actually going back to good old fashioned due diligence instead of taking abstract and artifical models as gospel.
This is important because a belief in models has been one of the key underpinnings of some major structural shifts in the Finance Industry over the last three decades and associted shifts in the US economy. As we learn to chant our new mantra and mediate on Due Diligence instead of models you might keep the chart in mind. It shows the shares of Profit by source, both in absolute and % terms, in the US Economy. The top sub-chart shows total profits (stacked btw !) and the bottom share %; don't know about you but our view is that the Finance Industry has moved front-n-center as a major driver. The question is was value created or destroyed ?
The weekly readings excerpts below are focused on business, business practices and individual firms. While there are some very interesting stories on Yahoo and MOT that need to be paid attention to the bulk of the stories have to do with problems in the Finance industry and the consequences thereof. Primarily the re-thinking of the business model, which is just barefly started. But also the consequences as bad judgement and poor modeling result in "unintended" consequences for the rest of the economy, e.g. credit is harder to get, the risk of defaults is rising and all those firms who re-leveraged themselves to buyback their stocks at the highest valuations in several years are now going to be struggling to keep themselves together.
This will sort itself out, and painfually. A lot of the buyout firms who helped us into this mess are already building up the stores of dry powder (new funds) to take advantage, i.e. they're going to be looking for buying distressed companies, distressed debt, etc. for $.50 on the $1 ! As this sorting goes on the real winners will be the firms and industries who have an effective business model or who re-invent one. Finding them will be the interesting challenge.
General & Special
Investing in Better Research Despite occasional good reporting, far too many financial journalists know less about investing than their readers. I had dinner with a friend of a friend the other night and he was telling me about the Rothschild formula for investing. According to him, this involves not participating in the first 20 percent or the last 20 percent of an investment run-up. Instead, it's investing in the middle 60 percent, when risks are low and the direction of the price is determined. As the asset value approaches what appears to be the last 20 percent, you sell and move on to another asset class. As we all know, most amateurs (and, possibly, many reporters) only participate in the last 20 percent. I wondered if the reporter who asked why I was investing millions in stocks was an investor himself. I did my best to explain to him that there are two things professionals invest for: 1) Capital gains, and 2) Cash flow. The problem with much of the financial news in print and on the web, radio, and television is that it comes from journalists who may not be investors. When I listen to most journalists whine and cry about the subprime mess, the slowdown in the economy, and the volatile stock market, I can all but tell that they're not really investors. None of these events really has much impact on professional
Business Practices
Leave Sinking Firm or Try for Rescue A manager who stays may get a chance to take on more responsibility as others bail. Experience handling such crises may be valuable to future employers. Plus, some executives feel a moral obligation to try to save the company and help employees.But staying also can carry big risks. If the executive ultimately loses his post, being associated with a failed or troubled company can carry a stigma in the job market.
Preparing Your Professional Checklist As an executive coach, I find that my clients almost always know what they should do. They, like all human beings, just don't always do it. In the same way the nurses in Dr. Pronovost's research remind doctors to do what they already know they are supposed to, I remind executives. Just as in Dr. Pronovost's research, it works! For example, almost every leader preaches -- and believes in -- the value of synergy and cross-organizational teamwork. Many of these same leaders slip on occasion and blast their cross-organizational colleagues in team meetings. This destructive communication is generally contagious, leads to direct reports joining in the bash-fest, and ultimately undermines cross-organizational teamwork. If these same leaders had a checklist that included No. 5 above, this behavior might not be eliminated but it would greatly decrease.
Business Environment
Market Bloodbath Highlights Cracks in Capitalism Any banker, trader or investor asked to invent the perfect market environment for creating wealth beyond the wildest dreams of avarice would come up with conditions akin to those of the past decade. So what went wrong? The financial community, through greed, stupidity and hubris, has fouled its own sandpit. The era of munificent money- making conditions -- gentle regulation, ever-faster information flows, freely available credit, unprecedented access to global investors and oil-enriched buyers of anything yielding north of zero -- is ending with an almighty bang, not a whimper. Realtors appraised homes at fictitious levels. Lenders granted mortgages to people who couldn't pay. Bankers created Frankenstein instruments they couldn't value. Traders invented prices they couldn't justify. And investors bought securities they didn't understand.
- O Wise Bank, What Do We Do? (No Fibbing Now) But for all its power, the Fed cannot change this troubling fact: trust in much of the financial system — banks, brokerage houses, ratings agencies, bond insurers, regulators — has been severely damaged by the subprime mortgage crisis. And that damage cannot be reversed with a quick cut in interest rates. It is not just a matter of attracting fresh capital from overseas to replace some of the $100 billion lost or written off so far — a figure that is sure to grow. The underlying problem for some of the world’s largest financial firms is restoring confidence, among big institutional investors and 401(k) nest-egg holders alike. That’s what has to happen if the capital markets are to run smoothly over the long term.
Atonement Comes to Wall Street as Guardians of Risk Get Summons From Exile As the subprime crisis has unfolded, spurring at least $133 billion in writedowns and credit losses and claiming the jobs of four chief executive officers, the risk managers charged with preventing those kinds of disasters have largely languished on the sidelines. Banks, emboldened by three years of record profits, failed to heed warnings of their risk managers or give them enough power and data to do their jobs, says Joseph Mason, a professor of finance at Drexel University in Philadelphia who researches risk management…Wall Street firms have long viewed risk managers as advisers, not decision makers. They are there to support the bankers and traders who generate revenue. At JPMorgan Chase & Co., which took a $1.3 billion writedown in the fourth quarter, the risk department for investment banking has 700 employees. Risk managers build sophisticated models to predict potential losses from investments and to set overall trading limits. The bankers and traders are supposed to consider the findings of risk managers in deciding whether to reduce or hedge bets. It doesn't always work that way. For one thing, risk managers often rely on traders to give them the data and formulas they need to do their jobs. That's what happened with collateralized debt obligations -- packages of securities that are based on home mortgages and other loans. CDOs, whose values dropped as much as 100 percent from July to December, don't have readily available market prices because they're thinly traded. In many instances, traders gave risk managers insufficient or misleading information about the pricing models for the securities, making their task more difficult.
Death of VaR Evoked on Wall Street as Risk-Taking Meets Taleb's Black Swan The risk-taking model that emboldened Wall Street to trade with impunity is broken and everyone from Merrill Lynch & Co. Chief Executive Officer John Thain to Morgan Stanley Chief Financial Officer Colm Kelleher is coming to the realization that no algorithm or triple-A rating can substitute for old-fashioned due diligence. Value at risk, the measure banks use to calculate the maximum their trades can lose each day, failed to detect the scope of the U.S. subprime mortgage market's collapse as it triggered more than $130 billion of losses since June for the biggest securities firms led by Citigroup Inc., Merrill, Morgan Stanley and UBS AG. The past six months have exposed the flaws of a financial measure based on historical prices that securities firms use idiosyncratically and that doesn't anticipate every potential disaster, such as the mistaken credit ratings on defaulted subprime debt.
With credit markets in turmoil, many companies are finding it harder to get the money they need to fuel their businesses. With credit markets in turmoil, many companies are finding it harder to get the money they need to fuel their businesses. Small companies with less-than-perfect financial histories -- the majority of American companies -- are being hit especially hard. Even small companies far removed from the world of housing and crumbling bonds, such as Emrise, are finding it tougher and more expensive to borrow.
Sovereign Funds Beat Buffett on Wall Street With Citigroup, Merrill Stake Citigroup Inc. and Merrill Lynch & Co. shareholders, who've held on to the stocks through a 50 percent decline in value, now face having their stakes diluted as sovereign wealth funds snap up convertible preferred shares at terms unheard of 20 years ago. The last time the biggest U.S. securities firms went hat in hand to outside investors was in 1987 when New York-based Salomon Inc. turned to Warren Buffett, the world's most successful stock- picker, for $700 million to fend off an unwanted takeover. Even billionaire Buffett didn't earn a fraction of the premium that state-managed funds in Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Korea and Singapore negotiated for the more than $21 billion they invested in New York-based Citigroup and Merrill, let alone the equity they'll get in about three years' time. Buffett was paid a 9 percent dividend, 1.75 percentage points more than the U.S. Federal Reserve's overnight lending rate. By contrast, the 11 percent that some of today's investors are pocketing represents a spread of 6.5 percentage points.
Rout in Asia Stifles Deals Several billion dollars in deals throughout Asia have been called off over the past few weeks on the recent market rout, with private-equity buyers pulling back and IPOs being shelved.
Buybacks, Bounces and Splats: Buying High, Selling Low Rather than wait for the weekend Readfest posting there are a couple of sets of interesting stories you ought to be reading now and thinking about heading into the weekend, next week and for the duration. The duration of what you may ask ? Well that's the question - the duration of the current unpleasantness of course. It's apparantly really beginning to dawn on the MSM though not widely that all the pressures for stock buybacks have resulted in attempting to prop up company stock prices have resulted in paying top prices and now, re-financing and re-capitalizing, at lower prices. Though some, including us have been beating that drum for quite a while now.
Industries & Companies
Paying for 'Goldman Envy' Citigroup could face a bigger struggle raising more new capital than Merrill, if the financial firms' latest fund-raising deals are any indication. Why did some banks and brokerage firms get so badly scorched by the subprime debacle and others come through relatively untouched? There are several reasons for this. One is luck. But something else explains a lot of the difference. The losers were infected by what one could call Goldman envy. The winners were more immune to the malady. The snag is that a bank is unlikely to manage things well when it's expanding rapidly and doesn't have experience. It may put the wrong people in place, not institute the right controls and implement the wrong incentive schemes. The banks and brokers with the biggest problems seem to have made such mistakes.
Citigroup's Sue-Me Game of Chicken May Double Enron Creditors' $13 Billion Enron Corp. creditors could see their original payout more than quadruple to as much as $31 billion after a trial against Citigroup Inc. Enron Creditors Recovery Corp., the entity winding up the defunct energy trader's affairs, distributed $13.3 billion, or 36 cents on the dollar, since a bankruptcy plan was approved in 2004. That includes most of $1.73 billion in out-of-court settlements with 10 of the 11 banks creditors accused of aiding the fraud that wiped out the company. They argue that Citigroup, the only lender that hasn't settled, should pay the rest of the claims, about $18 billion. The amount is more than six times the $2.8 billion reserve for Enron, WorldCom Inc. and initial public offering-related litigation that Citigroup disclosed in a Nov. 5 regulatory filing. Evidence at a trial set for April in New York may include an examiner's report citing bank e-mails as evidence Citigroup assisted in the fraud. Testimony against the bank by Andrew Fastow, Enron's imprisoned former chief financial officer, may also be introduced.
Prius Designer Says Toyota-Led Industry Fails to See Doom of Oil Addiction ``This is what the end of the age of oil means,'' says Reinert, 60, who plans the vehicles Toyota will make in a quarter century as national manager for advanced technology at the U.S. sales unit in Torrance, California. ``The car-based culture, the business-as-usual of building cars and trucks, is going to change dramatically.'' Since Henry Ford introduced the moving assembly line in 1913, the world's automakers have relied on a single source of power -- the gasoline-dependent internal combustion engine. Today, the twin threats of $100-a-barrel oil and global warming are convulsing an industry addicted to cheap, abundant petroleum. Auto companies, already hurt in 2007 by the lowest U.S. demand in a decade, are struggling to perfect cars that run on ethanol, diesel, natural gas, hydrogen and household electricity. They're under the gun from California and more than a dozen other states to cut carbon exhaust by 2020 with vehicles that must get 44 miles per gallon (19 kilometers per liter) of gasoline, about double today's average. Reinert says automakers are endangering themselves by basing sales and profits on the big, fast cars that many U.S. customers say they want in 2008. In five years, as oil shortages and global warming intensify, car companies may be out of step with drivers' demands for fuel-efficient vehicles. Even worse, degrading stretches of the planet like Fort McMurray will only delay --not prevent -- the time when the world must function in a post-peak- petroleum economy.
Sears's Unorthodox Tactics Encounter Stiff Head Winds Since acquiring control of the Sears retail empire in 2005, financier Edward S. Lampert has delighted fans and horrified traditionalists by relying on strategies that don't depend on sales growth. Shrinking per-store sales haven't bothered him, so long as other tactics kept operating earnings strong. Former employees and a wide range of retailing consultants kept predicting ruin, but Mr. Lampert until a few months ago benefited steadily from cutbacks in capital spending, occasional real-estate divestitures and aggressive investment of Sears Holdings Corp.'s cash. The company's soaring stock price seemed to vindicate his unorthodox approach. Not anymore. While Sears shares remain well above Mr. Lampert's original purchase price, they have skidded about 40% since July. Business at the company's 3,800 Sears and Kmart stores keeps waning. At stores open a year or more, sales were down 3.5% during the holiday season. Last week, Sears warned investors that the current quarter's profit will be disappointing. Right now, nobody in retailing is thriving. Mr. Lampert keeps trying to divert attention from Sears's empty aisles.
Yahoo's Ripe for Shake-Up Yahoo chief Jerry Yang recently summarized a plan to turn the company around by becoming the start page for every Internet user across the globe. What Mr. Yang failed to provide, however, was a convincing solution to Yahoo's existential crisis. The Hamlet of the Web won't succeed by simply trying to become a start page. Yahoo is navigating the waters of Internet advertising like a goldfish evading a shark, in the form of Google. Activist investors ought to take heed -- Yahoo is ready for a shake-up. Yahoo, based in Sunnyvale, Calif., has many ingredients that make it a tantalizing target for uppity investors. There's a discredited management team, a corporate strategy in need of a makeover, stock-price underperformance, a large free float with no controlling shareholder, cash on the balance sheet and many moving parts whose values don't appear to be adequately reflected in the Yahoo share price -- particularly its investments in two hot Asian Internet firms. Reports: Yahoo mulling major layoffs
Businesses Still Not Rushing to Vista Many businesses still aren’t rushing to buy Vista. That’s what we’re taking away from Microsoft’s earnings statement and analyst call. While this probably won’t mean trouble for Microsoft, it raises questions for businesses trying to shape their long-term technology strategy. Businesses look like they’re waiting, which makes sense: Microsoft is releasing an updated version of Vista soon, and no one likes to start a big tech project near the holidays. How long will they wait? A Forrester report from November found that more companies were switching to XP, an older version Windows, than Vista. (In its analyst call, Microsoft said businesses continue to “add client products,” words that seem carefully chosen.) Only 32% of businesses will have switched to Vista by the end of 2008 and nearly 60% of companies won’t have upgraded by the end of 2010, according to Forrester. Here’s the thing: The longer businesses wait to upgrade, the closer they’ll get to the release of Microsoft’s next operating system, Windows 7, which will reportedly come out towards the end of next year. And then businesses will face a decision.
Motorola's Brown May Face Razr 2 Flop as Apple's Jobs Scores With IPhone Motorola Inc.'s Greg Brown, in his first earnings report as chief executive officer, may post disappointing sales of the Razr 2 phone after holiday shoppers flocked to Apple Inc.'s iPhone. Motorola probably sold 2 million Razr 2s, the slimmer camera phones Brown is relying on to revive revenue, in the fourth quarter, said Lawrence Harris, a former Oppenheimer & Co. analyst in New York. Steve Jobs's Apple may have sold 2.4 million iPhones. Harris estimated Motorola sold half as many Razr 2s over a similar period compared with the original model, whose 2004 debut started a craze for ever-thinner phones. Motorola, which fell to third place among global phone makers last year, may drop to fourth in 2008.
· Motorola Profit Plunges, Loss Forecast as Customers Flee to Apple, Samsung Motorola Inc., the biggest U.S. mobile-phone maker, forecast an unexpected loss and said profit fell 84 percent last quarter as customers fled to Apple Inc. and Samsung Electronics Co. Motorola dropped 22 percent in New York trading. That's the biggest decline in almost seven years and puts the stock at its lowest since September 2003, when Chris Galvin was still running the company. Phone sales will drop ``significantly'' in the next three months after plunging 38 percent in the fourth quarter, Greg Brown said today in his first earnings call as chief executive officer. Motorola phones led by the Razr 2, the sequel to the best-selling model, have failed to lure consumers from Apple's iPhone, Samsung's Sync camera handset and Nokia Oyj devices.