The last post pretty well summarized the credit contagion crisis in it's title: WRFest 9Mar08(Economy): It's All About the Credit. And the results of being all about the credit is de-leveraging, magin calls and liquidation. The only real question left, aside from all thos messy...messy details, is how will this impact each of the players at the industry and company level. There's another one I guess - who'll be well-enough positioned to take advantage of this insanity by having the credit, cash and liquidiy to take advantage of what are really once-in-a-lifetime opportunities. Hopefully. After the break what we have are the week's business stories ranging from the beginning of hearings on finance industry CEO compensation (one of last week's potentially most interesting and important stories. Do the words de-regulation, Enron and SOX ring any bells. THINK about it). Almost all the rest of the stories can be summarized whether banks, LBO's, hedge funds, insurers, whatever is who survives and who doesn't. IF we're not being clear here this is going to be a real mess, take a lot to cleanup and is barely started. This is the Housing market ~ early '06 when everybody could see it coming who paid attention but the scope and breadth wasn't clear in the face of denials.
To put this in context this CNBC intereview with, among others, Wilbur Ross touches all these issues: Equities Roundtable
But here's a good strategy summary - which we'll suggest re-titling as "the damm thing's broke bad and we need to fix it before it sinks us !".Fallout Exposes Holes in Risk Rules Some of the top banking brains spent years designing rules to help financial institutions stay out of trouble. Their primary tenet: Banks should decide for themselves how much risk they should take on. But now those loose guidelines are facing a backlash. New Scenario: The global turmoil stemming from the U.S. mortgage crunch has banks and governments rethinking a set of risk-guidelines drafted a decade ago. The Players: Banking regulators, who have hatched a new set of rules, known as Basel II; bank executives, who are suddenly grappling with huge subprime-mortgage-related write-downs. Lessons Learned: Fears that hedge funds would be the source of the next crisis may have been off base, while confidence that banks knew how much risk they were taking was overstated. Today, in Washington, D.C., the Senate Banking Committee is expected to grill federal regulators on what went wrong. Did banks know how much risk they were taking? Did they know how much capital they needed to cushion them from sour loans? Did they prepare themselves adequately for the evaporation of "liquidity," or their ability to easily sell their securities or loans? The answer to all three questions appears to be "no." The recent financial blow-ups came largely not from hedge funds, whose lightly regulated status has preoccupied Washington for years, but from banks watched over by national governments.
Finance Industry Readings
Bank CEOs Blasted for Payouts Top banking industry executives earned hundreds of millions through their salary, retirement and stock sales last year while their companies got scorched by the mortgage market meltdown, a congressional report said Thursday. The report comes a day before Rep. Henry Waxman is expected to grill Angelo Mozilo, chief executive officer of Countrywide Financial Corp., former Citigroup CEO Charles Prince and Stan O'Neal, former CEO of Merrill Lynch & Co. In calling the hearing of his Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Waxman, D-Calif., said he'll examine if their "level of compensation is justified." With the three companies losing a combined $20 billion in the second half of 2007, Waxman wants to know how much the top executives are taking home -- and had his staff review internal documents and Securities and Exchange Commission filings to find out. The report said Mozilo received more than $120 million in compensation and stock sales last year. O'Neal left Merrill Lynch in October with $161.5 million in stock, options and retirement benefits, after leaving the brokerage with its biggest-ever quarterly loss and Prince left with a $10 million bonus, $28 million in stock and options and $1.5 million in other perks when he left Citigroup last fall, according to the report. Representatives for the three companies did not immediately comment.
Citigroup's Prospects Look Dim to Investors For the first time in well over a decade, Citigroup Inc. shares yesterday traded below book value, a yardstick that measures what would be left for shareholders if the company were liquidated. When Citibank fell below book value in credit crunch of the early 1990s, it was a great time to buy its stock. But when it comes to the current-day Citigroup, few see the unenviable drop below book as a reason to load up on the stock. Instead, it strongly indicates that investors fear that Citigroup's problems, which erupted last year with multibillion subprime related losses, are far from over.The stock was pummeled after the head of the $13 billion Dubai International Capital, a government investment fund, yesterday said that Citigroup remains in trouble despite the cash injections it recently has received from so-called sovereign-wealth funds in the Middle East and elsewhere. "It's going to take more than that to rescue Citi," said Sameer al-Ansari, the fund's chief executive, at a conference in Dubai. Adding to the gloom: A Merrill Lynch analyst warned that Citigroup is likely to report a first-quarter loss, dragged down by as much as $18 billion in first-quarter write-downs on loans and investments. Since November, Citigroup has collected more than $20 billion in capital from sovereign funds and other investors, including Abu Dhabi and Kuwait, but not Dubai. That essentially made up for the write-downs the bank suffered in the second half of 2007. Four at Four: Ten Years Gone at Citi
· What went wrong at Citigroup? The bank's balance sheet is fast deteriorating as customers struggle to meet credit obligations. The road to recovery may involve more job cuts, asset sales and cash infusions from overseas. So what is the matter with Citi? The list of problems is long, though nearly all stem from the credit and housing crises. Merrill's Moszkowski cites the "vicious" decline in home values and the "continued deterioration in U.S. residential and commercial mortgage markets, corporate debt markets and key investment-banking categories." Citi's Japanese consumer-finance business is having trouble, but the international bank's main troubles are in the United States. American consumers are having a tougher time meeting credit obligations, especially mortgages, causing loans on Citi's balance sheet to turn bad at a faster pace. Oppenheimer's Meredith Whitney, one of the Citi's most pessimistic (and, so far, correct) analysts, thinks Citi could be forced to sell up to $100 billion in assets. That's difficult to do while markets suffer from credit turmoil. Though analysts aren't questioning Citi's long-term survival, few expect an easy road ahead, especially if the credit crisis doesn't ease and loans continue turning sour. Keefe, Bruyette & Woods analyst Diane Merdian recently calculated a "worst-case scenario," which she places at a 10% probability of occurring: If Citi had to write off all of its subprime and other risky debt, it would take a $32 billion pretax hit, she figures, and Citi might need to raise $20 billion more in capital. That could cut Citi's share value to $15.19. That's another hit of more than 30%. Investors may continue running away from Citi's stock until they get signals -- either from the credit markets or from Citi executives -- that their worst nightmares won't come true.
Anatomy of a hedge fund collapse The recent collapse of the $150 million Tequesta Mortgage fund. Like much larger and higher-profile rivals that have imploded in recent weeks, Tequesta collapsed when it couldn't meet demands for more collateral from its prime broker - in Tequesta's case, Citigroup (C, Fortune 500). Unlike other hedge funds that cratered from bad housing-related bets, Tequesta steered clear of the mortgage- and asset-backed credit markets now getting walloped by the real estate bust. In fact, Tequesta's investment strategy of avoiding credit risk was paying off, according to bond salesmen and rival fund managers who bought the Tequesta positions seized by Citigroup. Tequesta's portfolio managers watched on the sidelines as banks dumped billions of dollars worth of mortgage bonds to free up capital. Even bonds backed by loans to the wealthiest Americans traded lower. This raised alarms among Tequesta's lenders. Executives at investment-bank prime brokerage operations saw the sharp drop in the value of Tequesta's holdings. Making matters worse: Unlike other lenders making margin calls, Citigroup was willing to liquidate inventory below loan values - the value it had assigned the bond when they initially provided the fund its margin - and recognize losses just to get the bonds off its books. A Citigroup spokeswoman declined comment. In one case, Citigroup seized collateral from Tequesta and put it up for sale in a bid-list auction. According to a trader at another firm, however, Citigroup's mortgage trading desk offered to sell Tequesta's bonds to regional brokerage firms at prices even lower than listed prices. In another instance, Tequesta's portfolio managers were told by Citigroup rivals that its seized bonds had been offered to other hedge funds for more than $25 below where they had been trading in the previous days.
Hedge Funds Squeezed by Lenders The financial turmoil is taking on a new dimension: Banks that lent money to hedge funds and other big risk-takers are asking for some of it back. Loans from banks and brokerages had allowed hedge funds, which manage some $1.9 trillion in clients' money, to amass many times that amount in investments. But as the value of mortgage-backed bonds and other investments has dropped in recent weeks, the lenders are demanding that borrowers put up more cash or assets. This is producing a negative cycle that has policy makers deeply worried. When investors rush to dump assets, prices fall and lenders feel compelled to make further demands, or "margin calls," which cause even more selling. So far, the turbulence touched off last summer hasn't resulted in many big hedge-fund blowups. If that changes, banks and other financial firms could end up holding even more hard-to-sell securities.
Cycles Pass, but Private Equity Is Forever Don’t write off private equity just yet because of the credit crunch. That, like all previous cycles, shall pass. Thus sayeth Alison Mass, co-head of Goldman Sachs Group’s financial-sponsors group, speaking at the 20th Annual Buyouts East 2008 conference today in New York. “Private equity is not a new business,” she said. “It consists of firms that have been in business for decades. But it’s a cyclical business. [The firms] have seen these cycles before.” Indeed, some of the best returns the industry has recorded came from down years, she said. In the downturn from 2000 to 2002, the best-performing firms generated annualized compound return rates of more than 10%, according to Mass. The industry has changed in other ways. Large firms, for instance, which are sitting on record amounts of cash, are holding their investments longer or are diversifying into other asset classes like real estate, hedge funds, mezzanine and distressed debt. Others are doing smaller deals. Mass said she is getting calls from clients looking to do deals in the $800 million range, which just a year ago the same firms couldn’t even afford to spend time on. “You have to keep the machine working,” Mass said.
Bond insurer crisis: A golden goose egg It's not all bad news for the bond insurance industry nowadays. The ongoing crisis, which has left smaller outfits like ACA Financial Guaranty Corp. in shambles and continues to threaten the survival of industry leaders Ambac and MBIA, is benefiting a select few companies. Two firms, in particular, Financial Security Assurance and Assured Guaranty Ltd. - financial guarantors with their AAA ratings firmly in place - have enjoyed a surge in new business just within the last few months. "This crisis, to this point, has been very good for them," said Matt Fabian, a managing director at Concord, Massachusetts-based consulting firm Municipal Market Advisors. FSA, which has consistently been a leader insuring municipal bonds in recent years, saw its market share jump above 65% this month, up from just 22% as of the end of 2007, according to Thomson Financial. Assured Guaranty (AGO) , on the other hand, was still a low-key player in the financial guaranty business in early 2007. Nowadays, it has the second-biggest market share in the municipal bond insurance industry behind FSA, according to Thomson.
Thornburg Faces Big Margin Calls, Survival at Stake Thornburg Mortgage Inc (NYSE:TMA - News), which provides loans to help people buy expensive homes, said on Friday its survival is at stake because it cannot meet its own lenders' demands for $610 million of cash or collateral. Shares of Thornburg fell 43 cents, or 26 percent, to $1.22 in afternoon trading on the New York Stock Exchange. The news caused a decline in bank stocks and broader U.S. market indexes on concern that credit market turmoil may spread further. Thornburg said falling mortgage prices, together with liquidity imperiled by a surge of margin calls from its own lenders, "have raised substantial doubt about the company's ability to continue as a going concern." It said the margin calls "significantly exceeded" its cash, though some lenders froze further calls through Friday. Margin calls force borrowers to pay back loans or post collateral. Analysts have said Santa, Fe, New Mexico-based Thornburg might need to file for bankruptcy protection.The company has struggled as investors stop buying many mortgage securities they no longer consider safe. These include the large, adjustable-rate mortgages in which Thornburg specializes, including many with "triple-A" credit ratings.