Key Postings III: Credit Breakdown, Liquidities and the Fed
This is the third in a set of postings collections designed to provide 1-stop shopping for key and critical topic areas. The previous ones dealt with the Economy and the Markets and both can be found in the Key Posts archive along with selected individual key posts. The basic idea in all cases is to collect pervious fairly deep dives that provide tools that ought to be in your toolbox for understanding and analyzing each of these areas. Hopefully with the idea that the fluttering complexities of the headlines and various talking heads can be filterred and interpreted into a coherent whole using them. You'll have to let me know.
As just about everybody has realized this ain't your standard downturn because it's being heavily influenced by deep structural breakdowns in the credit markets. Earlier posts reviewed the situation we face with a "normally" slowing economy compounded by the sudden downturn in Housing which was, directly and indirectly, the engine that drove our so-called recovery over the last several years. The boom in asset prices, including it should be noted, the stock market was driven by liquidity and leverage based on the gross under-pricing of risks (as well as bad to malfeasant business management in the financial sector).
We've all, including the experts, been struggling to get a handle on what's going on here. An analogy that occurs to me is to compare the economy to a complex piece of machinery or process manufacturing plant. For example a refinery. Now that machinery is energized and controlled by the credit markets which ship the necessary lubricants from real marekt to real market to keep everything turning over. The relationships between multiple credit markets are usually so stable and predictable that all we need to understand is the distribution of interest rates over time and over risk. The first is otherwise called the yield curve and describes the range of rates from short-term to very long-term. The second is the spread between different markets and instruments and represents the estimated riskiness associated with each instrument and seperate market. When short-term rates rise above long-term ones we have an inverted yield curve indicating that demand for loanable funds will gone down due to economic slowing. A situation we're in now. And when spreads between markets rise as liquidity is pulled out of the system then the relative risk factors are being re-adjusted. Three/four times since last August those spreads have spiked tremendously as people realized they had no clue as to the actual risk and return situation.
BUT....BUT...BUT we're actually had a much more arcane and dangerous situation which is a
meltdown in the fundamental functioning of the credit markets. Otherwise describable as not being able to get loans and funds at any price. This is similar to the infamous liquidity trap of macro-theory fame but has taken place in the credit markets. It was created by that Fear Factor and when it's in play traditional monetary policy WILL NOT work - the standard mechanisms of inter-market credit adjustment are broken. Perhaps the best way to continue the analogy is go to back to the plumbing notion. We've got blocked pipes, corroded pipes, broken ones and badly kinked ones. What the Fed is trying to do is repair all that damage and let the normal, and hopefully orderly, processes of a recession work out without subsiding into a major economic collapse. In doing so they've displayed amazing insight and ingenuity and may, with this week's moves have reached a point where they've found the basic toolkit that they can use to manage an orderly downturn without it turning into a disaster. Let's hope so.
CREDIT BREAKDOWN TOOLKIT
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Credit Markets and Liquidties Problems | |||||||||||||||
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